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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past forty years, efforts to limit or prohibit advertising to
children have faced a powerful combination of political and constitutional
limitations. The political will and pressure have not been exerted to enact
and enforce meaningful regulations that curtail, in all media, the
proliferation of advertising directed at children. Such advertising exploits
the very market failures that governments around the world, including our
own, seek to minimize. Yet even when restrictions on advertising are
enacted, they are inevitably met with constitutional challenges. These two
limitations—political and constitutional—rest, however, on faulty
assumptions about human behavior in the marketplace. This Article
demonstrates that removing faulty assumptions reduces the logic of
constitutional challenges, even under existing case law.
Between the years 1990 and 2000, the amount of money spent by
children doubled. 1 In 2000, children twelve years old and younger
accounted for $28 billion in personal spending and influenced $250 billion
in family expenditures. 2 The desire to advertise to children is further
*
Senior Scholar and Distinguished Teaching Professor of Economics,
Bowling Green State University.
**
Research Associate, Honors Scholar, Bowling Green State University.
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1.
BARRIE GUNTER ET AL., ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN ON TV—CONTENT,
IMPACT, AND REGULATION 2 (2005) (citing Lawlor & Prothero, The Established and
Potential Mediating Variables in the Child’s Understanding of Advertising Intent:
Towards a Research Agenda, 18 J. MARKETING MGMT. 481 (2002)).
2.
Id.
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increased by the fact that children have the largest future market potential
of any consumer group. 3 In addition, children in the United States spend
an average of four to five hours per day watching some form of electronic
media. 4 The hours in front of the television add up to one-sixth of a child’s
life, which is the equivalent of over sixty days per year of media influence. 5
While watching television, it is estimated that children view more than
40,000 advertisements every year. 6 Furthermore, the majority of the
advertisements children see are for high-caloric or fatty foods, such as
candy, sugary cereal, fast food, junk food, and soft drinks. 7
Is this form of commercial speech beneficial to child consumers? Is
advertising to children a form of discourse that increases product
knowledge and helps children make informed decisions in the market?
Most importantly, do children have enough knowledge and training to see
through advertising ploys and biases and apply the proper weight to the
seductive and misleading advertisements? 8 Does advertising to children
also affect the way they perceive reality and society? Are children able to
accurately perceive dangers and risks associated with the products they see
on television? 9 Are commercials conditioning our children to act the way
3.
See James U. McNeal, Tapping the Three Kids’ Markets, AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr. 4, 1998, at 37–39 (noting that brand loyalty is important to gain
with children at a young age to ensure future consumption, and children have the most
spending years ahead of them out of any age cohort).
4.
R. Cook, Kids and Media, 2006 INT’L J. OF ADVER. AND MARKETING TO
CHILDREN 29.
5.
See id.
6.
Dale Kunkel, Children and Television Advertising, in HANDBOOK OF
CHILDREN AND THE MEDIA 375, 376 (Dorothy G. Singer & Jerome L. Singer eds.,
2001) (citing D. Kunkel & W. Gantz, Children’s Television Advertising in the MultiChannel Environment, 42 J. COMM. 134, 134–52 (1992)).
7.
E. Katherine Battle & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting a Rising Tide of
Eating Disorders and Obesity: Treatment vs. Prevention and Policy, 21 ADDICTIVE
BEHAVS. 755, 761 (1996).
8.
See Joel J. Davis, Ethics and Environmental Marketing, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS
81, 84 (1992) (arguing that regulations designed to protect consumers from the
deceptive practices of businesses are often ineffectual or misused by companies). Even
though the Federal Trade Commission restricts what advertisers can say about their
products, advertisers continue to say things that technically may be true, but are
misleading due to the omission or obscuration of facts necessary for the public to
properly interpret the advertisements. Id. That is, “marketers have a history of
pushing regulatory guidelines to their limits, relying on scientific truths to substantiate
their claims and ignoring the manner in which the typical consumer will interpret the
claim.” Id.
9.
See generally Karl A. Boedecker, Fred W. Morgan, & Jeffrey J. Stoltman,
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advertisers desire? 10
The field of advertising assumes a rational
consumer, 11 but what should a nation do when confronted with the
Excessive Consumption: Marketing and Legal Perspectives, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 301 (1999)
(outlining the dangers associated with excessive consumption of advertised products).
Specifically, in trying to attract new customers to a market, advertisers may attract
consumers who are less able than current customers to understand either how to use an
item or the risks associated with the product. Id. at 302. For example, in 1990, Nabisco
introduced a brand of cigarettes targeted at young, less-educated females. Id.
Subsequently, experts criticized this strategy, arguing that the specific segment of
smokers the ads targeted was more vulnerable than adults to glamorized smoking. Id.
10.
See Omer Lee Reed, Jr., The Psychological Impact of TV Advertising and
the Need for FTC Regulation, 13 AM. BUS. L.J. 171, 175–78 (1975) (noting the ways in
which advertisers “condition” their audience to purchase products, just as psychologist
Pavlov conditioned his dog to unknowingly salivate at the sound of a bell).
11.
See Tamara R. Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the
Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 383 (2001). Marketers assume rationality to justify their
advertisements. Id. If, indeed, consumers do not make rational decisions, it follows
that advertisements would be deceptive and coercive, influencing consumers through
immoral means. However, there is much debate over whether adults, let alone
children, are rational consumers. Piety argues, “behavioral research has discovered
that human beings’ capacity to reason, even when employing what appears to be only
‘reason,’ is subject to predictable biases.” Id. at 402 (citing JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). For
instance, adults have the tendency to misread evidence as confirming their own
previously established views, thus engaging in “confirmatory bias.” Id. The tobacco
industry relies heavily on the “optimistic bias,” or “[t]he tendency to underestimate the
probability that an undesirable occurrence . . . will happen to the individual.” Id. at 403
(citing Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 658 (1999)). Piety further
argues that advertising may rely most heavily on “availability and representativeness
biases,” or “[t]he tendency both to calculate probabilities on the basis of the most
available, and often the most vivid, facts and to attribute greater weight to known
occurrences than is appropriate.” Id. This bias infiltrates commercials through the
concept of “brand identification.” Id. Thus, it is unclear if adults are the rational
consumers the advertising industry claims they are.
Furthermore, there is a large body of research indicating the irrationality of consumers.
See generally Aradhna Krishna & Maureen Morrin, Does Touch Affect Taste? The
Perceptual Transfer of Product Container Haptic Cues, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 807
(2008). Krishna and Morrin analyze the ways in which consumers perceptually transfer
product packaging characteristics to judgments about the products themselves. For
instance, does food taste better when served on fine china rather than paper plates?
Rationally speaking, the product containers should not affect the actual quality or taste
of the products within those containers; however, packaging still affects people’s
perceptions of the food’s taste. Id. at 816–17.
The prevalence of superstitious beliefs is also evidence of irrational consumer
behavior. See Thomas Kramer & Lauren Block, Conscious and Nonconscious
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imbalance of power between large, deceptive advertisers and young
children who are psychologically and intellectually at the opposite pole
from the traditionally assumed rational consumer? This Article argues that
advertising to children should be treated as a special category of
advertising due to the unique nature of the audience and the detrimental
effects advertising has on America’s children. 12
This Article is organized as follows: Part II explores the harmful
effects of advertising directed at children. These adverse effects provide
the evidence and reasons for stricter federal regulation of advertising to
children and also provide courts with grounds to find that the state has a
substantial interest in regulating such advertising. Part III looks at the role
politics, Congress, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) play in regulating advertising aimed
at children. While Congress and federal agencies must be mindful of the
constitutional limitations on their ability to regulate advertising, their
ability to craft meaningful legislation and regulations is the crucial first step
in the process. Part IV takes the next step and examines the history and
current status of the “commercial speech doctrine,” which guides the
courts’ analysis of the permissibility of the regulations promulgated by the
various federal agencies. While the government has a substantial interest
in protecting children from certain speech, the government must overcome
other critical factors in crafting its regulations. Part V applies the
constitutional test first developed in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission to evaluate hypothetical regulations on
Components of Superstitious Beliefs in Judgment and Decision Making, 34 J.
CONSUMER RES. 783 (2008). The authors document the existence and the influence of
these superstitions, and show that when they are permitted to operate on a
subconscious level, they have a “robust effect . . . on consumers’ satisfaction judgments
and risk-taking behavior.” Id. at 791. For many, market decisions are governed by
everything from lucky numbers to feng shui. See id. at 783–85. Billions of dollars
annually are spent on tarot cards, astrology readings, and trinkets from competing
religions, at least some of which logically must be false. A perfectly informed actor
would not spend his money on products that offered to do things they could not
possibly do, like reveal the future or cast a spell on an enemy. There is, therefore, no
assumption of perfectly informed rational calculation in Kramer and Block’s account.
See id.
12.
See DALE KUNKEL ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
APA TASK FORCE ON ADVERTISING AND CHILDREN 1 (2004) (explaining the
American Psychological Association’s evidence that confirms “children lack the
cognitive skills and abilities . . . [to] . . . comprehend commercial messages in the same
way as do more mature audiences” and concluding that children are “uniquely
susceptible to advertising influence”).
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advertising to children. 13 Part V then concludes that increased government
regulation can pass the courts’ intermediate scrutiny for commercial
speech. Part VI looks to Europe and Canada for ideas and ways to limit
children’s exposure to unwanted advertising. Part VII then anticipates and
refutes the major counterarguments against increased regulation of
advertising aimed at children.
II. THE DANGERS OF ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN: INDIVIDUAL AND
SOCIETAL HARM
The vulnerability of children makes them especially deserving of
protections from harmful influences.
The American Academy of
Pediatrics noted that children younger than eight years old “accept
advertising claims at face value” and are therefore “cognitively and
psychologically defenseless against advertising.” 14 The harm and risk to
children is particularly acute. A recent study estimates that a total ban on
fast food advertising to children and adolescents “would reduce the
number of overweight children ages [three to eleven] in a fixed population
by 18 percent.” 15 While arguments abound for a more robust commercial
speech doctrine, 16 special attention needs to be paid to children.
An increased understanding of the direct and tangible harms that our
children and society bear as a result of advertising aimed at this most
vulnerable group of our community will increase the pressure to form
meaningful regulations on advertising. We cannot ignore the future longterm risks that children face every time an advertiser broadcasts
commercials directed at the youth of our nation. 17
13.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
14.
Victor C. Strasburger et al., Policy Statement, Children, Adolescents, and
Advertising, 118 PEDIATRICS 2563, 2563 (2006).
15.
Shin-Yi Chou et al., Fast-Food Restaurant Advertising on Television and
Its Influence on Childhood Obesity, 51 J.L. & ECON., 599, 599 (2008).
16.
See Daniel E. Troy, Commercial Speech: Defending the Language of
Capitalism, in SPEAKING FREELY: THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN UNFETTERED SPEECH 67–
72 (1995) (arguing that information is not harmful but rather information allows people
to understand their preferences and act in their best interests); see also Va. State Bd. of
Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (suggesting society
should “assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means
to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them”).
17.
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 220–25 (1995) (explaining that individuals make
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A. Advertisements Exploit Children’s Lack of Understanding
For doctors, parents, teachers, and legal scholars alike, “[t]he
underlying concern about television advertising is whether it exploits
children.” 18 Adults consider children to be particularly vulnerable to
advertising because they possess less knowledge about the intent of
advertisers and the processes by which advertisements are created. 19
Children are not born with any knowledge of advertising techniques or
economic systems. 20 Rather, their awareness of marketing develops only
gradually with time and education. 21 Thus, the American Academy of
Pediatrics declared that advertising is inherently deceptive because
children below certain ages do not have the capacity to fully realize the
nature and quality of advertisements. 22
Children are more vulnerable to advertisements because unlike
adults, they are not aware that the intended purpose of advertisements is to
persuade people to buy products. 23 Conversely, adults understand that
advertisements are intentionally created to present products to appear as
attractively as possible and often contain misleading or biased
information. 24 Furthermore, adults recognize “who pays for and produces
advertisements” on television and that advertisements are “part of an
economic system that depends on selling products.” 25 Therefore, adults
have the capability to react with informed decisions regarding television
advertisements, but it is unclear if children possess the insight to interpret
advertisements in the same context as adults do. Additionally, evidence
suggests that young children generally do not comprehend the persuasive
intent of advertisements, displaying no cynicism toward or critical
decisions and calculate risk based on unreliable sources and tend to “give too little
weight to future benefits and costs as compared to present benefits and costs,” and that
consumers tend to underestimate risks associated with situations).
18.
GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
19.
See generally Caroline Oates et al., Children’s Understanding of Television
Advertising: A Qualitative Approach, 9 J. MARKETING COMM. 59 (2003) (exploring
children’s understanding of television using focus groups made up of children of
different ages).
20.
GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 9.
21.
See BARRIE GUNTER & ADRIAN FURNHAM, CHILDREN AS CONSUMERS:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE YOUNG PEOPLE’S MARKET 123–24 (1998).
22.
Steven Shelov et al., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Children, Adolescents, and
Advertising, 95 PEDIATRICS 295, 295 (1995).
23.
GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 9.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
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questioning of the information in advertisements that older children and
adults display. 26 When asked about the purpose of advertisements, the
majority of children below six years of age cannot explain the selling
purpose, and are therefore more likely to perceive the advertisement as
truthful. 27 However, the majority of children ages eight to twelve believe
advertisements are truthful only some of the time, or not at all. 28 This
demonstrates that with time, children do gain a greater understanding of
the reality of advertising. The problem is that without life experiences and
knowledge, many children see advertisements as providing unbiased
information or entertainment programming rather than calculated
salesmanship. 29 What children do not realize is that the advertisements are
highly biased and employ technology and special effects designed to
convince the consumer to buy into the advertisers’ salesmanship. 30 For
these reasons, advertising to children is often misleading or untruthful to
the consumer. 31
B. Advertising’s Role in Enforcing Negative Societal Stereotypes
In addition to the concern that advertising exploits children’s naiveté
for economic gain, there is also the concern that advertising affects
children’s perceptions of social reality. Advertisers contribute to how and
26.
GUNTER & FURNHAM, supra note 21, at 123.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 133.
29.
See ROY F. FOX, HARVESTING MINDS: HOW TV COMMERCIALS CONTROL
KIDS 50 (1996).
30.
See M. Joseph Sirgy & Chenting Su, The Ethics of Consumer Sovereignty
in an Age of High Tech, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 5–9 (2000) (arguing that in a market based
on technologically advanced products, consumer sovereignty is a fiction because in the
high-tech world, consumers do not have access to the technical information they need
about products, and even if they did it would be difficult for them to process
information about quality in a way that would aid their decision).
31.
In Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183
(1999), the Supreme Court affirmed that the government has a substantial interest in
advertising that is not misleading. See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980) (holding that misleading commercial
speech is not protected by the First Amendment). If the Supreme Court is saying the
government has a substantial interest in truthful advertising, it follows that the
government also has an interest in regulating misleading advertising. In other words, if
advertising is misleading to child consumers, logically the government has a greater
interest in regulating these advertisements. If advertising to children misleads them
due to a lack of knowledge and understanding, ignorance concerning the intention of
marketers, and overall unfamiliarity with market processes, it appears the government
has a substantial interest in the regulation of such advertisements.
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what we think about other people and ourselves. The danger is that
advertising to children may encourage them to form unrealistic and clichéd
opinions about society. 32 For instance, children as young as three who are
television viewers have more rigid attitudes about what jobs are
appropriate for men and women compared to their peers who watch less
television. 33 Specifically, the nature of advertising in relation to gender
generally demonstrates the following features: Men are shown in more
roles than women; women are shown in more family roles; a man’s world is
outside the home; and women do activities in the home while men are the
beneficiaries of these activities. 34 Furthermore, an article from the New
York Times entitled “What Are Commercials Selling to Children?”
answers with “[a] world where food is sweet and blond is best,” girls like
dolls, and “black children play supporting roles.” 35
C. Advertising’s Effect on Children’s Health
Special consideration for children’s health is necessary because
advertisements for food products make up the majority of advertisements
directed at children, and most of the advertised foods are unhealthy. 36
Specifically, eighty percent of commercials directed toward children are for
food. 37 Furthermore, one study indicates that only a small percentage of
food commercials contain nutritional information about the product. 38
Thus, there is little disclosure about fat content or high sodium levels
during advertisements directed at children. 39 In addition, the amount of
children’s advertising has not remained constant since previous decades. 40
32.
See generally GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 130–32 (explaining the
negative effects of advertising on stereotyping).
33.
FOX, supra note 29, at 13.
34.
Id. at 14.
35.
John J. O’Conner, What Are Commercials Selling to Children?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 1988, at C20.
36.
SUSAN ELLIOT ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FINAL STAFF REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION 49–50 (1981).
37.
Dan Glickman, Sec’y of Agric., USDA Symposium on Childhood
Obesity:
Causes and Prevention 4 (Oct. 27, 1998) (transcript available at
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1998/10/0445).
38.
See Aya Kuribayashi et al., Actual Nutritional Information of Products
Advertised to Children and Adults on Saturday, 30 CHILDREN’S HEALTH CARE 309,
318–19 (2001).
39.
Id.
40.
See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN
CHILDHOOD OBESITY 1 (2004) (noting that in recent years there has been an
“explosion in media targeted to children”).
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The number of advertisements directed at children has steadily increased
over the past twenty years and has doubled since the 1970s. 41 During the
same period, the rate of children’s obesity more than tripled, rising from
The important message when discussing
four to fifteen percent. 42
advertising is that studies link the increase in advertisements for unhealthy
foods directed at children with the growing rates of childhood obesity. 43
That is, evidence suggests that exposure to food advertising affects
children’s food preferences and eating behavior. 44
Furthermore, a large body of evidence suggests that advertisers of
unhealthy foods and sedentary entertainment products for children may be
causing premature death by obesity and related diseases. 45 In particular,
health conditions such as heart disease, diabetes, and stroke result from
patterns of low levels of physical activity and a poor diet. 46 These dangers
exist because not only does obesity cause health problems for children, but
poor eating habits developed during childhood persist throughout one’s
Obesity is not merely a personal problem—obesity is a
life. 47
governmental concern due to the high costs it is inflicting on the United
States healthcare system. 48 Currently, obesity is the second largest
contributor—only after tobacco use—to mortality rates in the United
41.
See id. at 4 (stating that the average number of television commercials
children viewed in the 1970s was approximately 20,000 per year and is currently
estimated to exceed an average of 40,000 per year).
42.
William A. Ramsey, Note, Rethinking Regulation of Advertising Aimed at
Children, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 361, 368 (2006).
43.
KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 12 (citing W. Dietz, You Are What You Eat—
What You Eat Is What You Are, J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE, Jan. 1990, at 76; K. B.
Horgan et al., Television Food Advertising:
Targeting Children in a Toxic
Environment, in THE HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND MEDIA 447, 450 (D.G. Singer &
J.L. Singer eds., 2001)).
44.
See COMM. ON FOOD MKTG. & THE DIETS OF CHILDREN & YOUTH, INST.
OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH:
THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 257–58 (J. Michael McGinnis et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter
THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY]; GERARD HASTINGS ET AL., CENTER FOR SOCIAL
MARKETING, REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF FOOD PROMOTION TO
CHILDREN: FINAL REPORT (2003).
45.
Bill Jeffery, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Appraisal of the 1980 Ban of
Advertising to Children in Quebec: Implications for “Misleading” Advertising
Elsewhere, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 237, 238 (2006).
46.
Id.
47.
KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 12, at 12.
48.
Jeffrey P. Koplan & William H. Dietz, Caloric Imbalance and Public
Health Policy, 282 JAMA 1579, 1579 (1999) (noting that direct and indirect obesity
costs contribute to approximately 10% of the United States healthcare budget).
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States. 49 In addition to the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by
obesity each year, it is estimated that obesity costs the American
healthcare system seventy billion dollars per year. 50
These harms are well documented, and the link between obesity and
advertising aimed at children is clear. 51 The World Health Organization,
the Kaiser Family Foundation, the British Food Commission, and the
Institutes of Medicine, just to name a few, all acknowledge the harmful
health effects associated with junk food advertising targeting children. 52
“Food and beverage advertisers alone spend between $10 billion to $12
billion a year targeting youth.” 53 Advertising harmful food to vulnerable
children calls for meaningful regulation.
III. POLITICAL LIMITATIONS: THE FTC, FCC, AND CONGRESS
While case law defines the parameters of the commercial speech
doctrine, it is the administrative agencies that have the regulatory power
over advertising policy in the United States. Almost since the inception of
television, Congress has provided the authority to regulate broadcasting.
In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act, requiring “that
television be regulated for the ‘public convenience, interest, or
necessity.’” 54 However, the history of advertising regulations demonstrates
an uneasiness about aggressively regulating commercial speech. 55 The two
most powerful government agencies that oversee and enforce regulations
effecting advertising directed at children are the FCC and the FTC. 56 Since

49.
Id.
50.
Glickman, supra note 37.
51.
THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY, supra note 44, at 8–10 (presenting the
committee’s findings on the relationship between advertising and childhood obesity).
52.
Susan Linn & Josh Golin, Beyond Commercials: How Food Marketers
Target Children, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 14 (2006).
53.
Id.
54.
Matt Getz, “Drowned in Advertising Chatter”: The Case for Regulating
Ad Time on Television, 94 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1253 (2006) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 307
(2000)).
Gaylord A. Jentz, Federal Regulation of Advertising:
False
55.
Representations of Composition, Character, or Source and Deceptive Television
Demonstrations, 6 AM. BUS. L.J. 409, 411 (1968) (explaining that the common law
principle of caveat emptor, which allowed a marketer or producer to “huff and puff his
wares,” was fixed in U.S. law). Furthermore, “[t]he concept of privity of contract as a
prerequisite for recovery also added to the plight of the consumer, thus the thought of
regulation was even greeted with hostility.” Id.
56.
The FTC is the primary federal agency that regulates all advertising, while
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at least the 1970s, both the FCC 57 and the FTC 58 have been aware of the
dangers of advertising to children. 59 The FTC’s authority to regulate
advertising directed at children is derived from Section 5 of the FTC Act,
which broadly prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. 60
When an advertisement is targeted to a specific audience, such as children,
the FTC determines the effect it has on a reasonable member of that
group—an ordinary child. 61 Specifically, the FTC has the power to regulate
misleading commercials. 62 The FTC has investigated numerous cases
challenging deceptive performance claims in toy advertisements. 63 When
considering regulation of commercials, it is important to note that in each
of these cases, the advertisement was examined from the viewpoint of a
child in the age group to which the toy was targeted, and while an adult
other advertising agencies exercise jurisdiction over certain products and forms of
media. See Ross D. Petty, FTC Advertising Regulation: Survivor or Casualty of the
Reagan Revolution?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 1–2, 33 (1992) (explaining that states and other
federal agencies are increasingly regulating advertising as well). Additionally, “[a]ll
fifty states have ‘little FTC acts’ and several have other advertising statutes.” Id. at 1
n.1.
57.
Children’s Television Report & Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 11
(1974).
58.
See J. Howard Beales III, Remarks at the George Mason Law Review
2004 Symposium on Antitrust and Consumer Protection: Competition, Advertising,
and Health Claims: Legal and Practical Limits on Advertising Regulation 6 (Mar. 2,
2004) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/040312childads.pdf)
(hereinafter Beales’s Remarks).
59.
Tracy Westen, Government Regulation of Food Marketing to Children:
The Federal Trade Commission and the Kid-Vid Controversy, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79,
80–81 (2006) (noting that by 1977, the FTC knew that children saw at least 20,000
commercial television ads a year, and that the children could not distinguish between
commercials and programs).
60.
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
61.
See In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 177–78 (1984) (“When
representations . . . are targeted to a specific audience, the Commission determines the
effect of the practice on a reasonable member of that group.”).
62.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (empowering the Commission to prevent use of
“deceptive acts . . . in or affecting commerce”).
63.
See, e.g., In re Hasbro, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 657 (1993) (commercials and
packaging used materially altered toys to advertise exaggerated features and
characteristics); In re Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 187 (1991) (false and
misleading advertisements ranged from depicting toys doing things without human
assistance to packaging showing additional toys that were not included); In re Gen.
Mills Fun Group, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 749 (1979) (misleading advertisement implied children
could control the speed and direction of the toy after launch); In re Mattel, Inc., 79
F.T.C. 667 (1971) (misrepresentations in packaging and advertising of Hot Wheels and
Dancerina Doll).
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viewer might not consider the commercial misleading, the advertisement
may prove misleading to children.
Despite some recent successes in regulating misleading advertising in
general, the FTC has not been entirely successful in regulating
advertisements directed at children. In the United States, the first
comprehensive efforts to regulate advertising to children were made in the
1970s. 64 Interest groups, such as Action for Children’s Television (ACT),
spearheaded the push for regulation of children’s advertising in the United
States. 65 Such petitions and lobbying prompted the FTC to investigate the
effects of advertising on children from 1971 to 1973. 66 In 1978, the FTC
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, which recommended regulation of
Four advocacy
advertisements aired during children’s television. 67
organizations—ACT, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, the
Consumers Union of America, and the Committee on Children’s
Television—petitioned the FTC to act in the area of children’s
advertisements. 68 In its notice of proposed rulemaking, the Commission
proposed the following:
(a) Ban all television advertising for any product which is directed to,
or seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of children
who are too young to understand the selling purpose of or otherwise
comprehend or evaluate the advertising;
(b) Ban televised advertising for sugared food products directed to, or
seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of older
children, the consumption of which poses the most serious dental
health risks;
(c) Require televised advertising for sugared food products not
included in Paragraph (b), which is directed to, or seen by, audiences
64.
GUNTER & FURNHAM, supra note 21, at 184 (discussing FTC attempts to
ban all advertising directed at young children).
65.
Tracy Reilly, The “Spiritual Temperature” of Contemporary Popular
Music: An Alternative to the Legal Regulation of Death-Metal and Gangsta-Rap Lyrics,
11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 335, 369–73 (2009). The group has since disbanded but
was responsible for numerous petitions to the Federal Communications Commission
and for bringing several suits in federal court.
66.
FCC Children’s Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1,
1–2 (1974).
67.
FTC, Children’s Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17967 (proposed Apr. 27,
1978).
68.
Id. at 17968.
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composed of a significant proportion of older children, to be balanced
by nutritional and/or health disclosures funded by advertisers. 69

Public and political opposition to the FTC’s idea of regulating
children’s advertisements ensued. 70 Consumer organizations, broadcasters,
product manufacturers, advertising agencies, and individual consumers
submitted hundreds of written comments, totaling 60,000 pages. 71
Subsequently, FTC staff terminated the rulemaking proceeding because
workable solutions to regulate child-oriented television advertising were
not available at the time. 72 Furthermore, the FTC determined that it
lacked the resources to pursue further the regulation of children’s
advertising. 73 Even worse for the future of the FTC, the failed attempt at
regulation was not taken lightly. The notice of proposed rulemaking led to
“Congress [allowing] the agency’s funding to lapse, and the agency was
literally shut down for a brief time.” 74 “It was more than a decade after the
FTC terminated the rulemaking before Congress . . . reauthorize[d] the
agency” to make policy regarding children’s advertising or any substantially
similar proceeding. 75 This proposed regulation was by far the most
exhaustive examination ever undertaken to restrict advertising to children,
and ever since the regulation’s failure, a negative stigma has plagued the
realm of advertising regulation. 76
When considering the possibility for future regulations, it is important
to note that “[t]he [current] FTC seems reluctant to completely ban
advertising aimed at children” because of its past failure and the political

69.
Id. at 17969. Children too young to understand the purposes of
advertising were considered to be those under the age of eight. Id. Older children
were considered to be those between the ages of eight and twelve. Id.
70.
See Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at
A22 (describing the FTC’s proposed regulations as protecting children from the
weakness of their parents, not from sugar-coated cereals).
71.
ELLIOT ET AL., supra note 36, at 13.
72.
FTC Children’s Advertising, 46 Fed. Reg. 48710, 48713 (rulemaking
proceeding terminated Oct. 2, 1981).
73.
Id.
74.
J. Howard Beales III, Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory
Retrospective That Advises the Present, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 873, 879 n.3 (2004)
(citing A.O. Sulzberger Jr., After Brief Shutdown, F.T.C. Gets More Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 1980, at D1) (“[S]hutting down a single agency because of disputes over policy
decisions is almost unprecedented.”).
75.
Id. at 880.
76.
See FTC, Children’s Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17967 (proposed Apr. 27,
1978).
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views of FTC commissioners. 77 That is, many of the commissioners of the
FTC are against any further regulation of advertising to children, and so
the regulations are not pursued. Former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris
believed that regulating advertising to children would not solve the
Similarly, former FTC
“obesity epidemic” in the United States. 78
Commissioner Orson Swindle believed that industry should lead efforts to
regulate itself, with the government in a backup enforcement position. 79
Likewise, former Commissioner J. Howard Beales III believed that the
ramifications of the FTC’s attempt to regulate advertising aimed at
children in the 1970s would dictate the FTC’s current policies 80 and that the
FTC “will tread very carefully when responding to calls to restrict truthful
advertising to children.” 81 Therefore, the current FTC stance does not
provide much optimism for federal agency regulation of advertising to
children in the near future. It remains to be seen whether the Obama
administration appoints commissioners who are more willing to regulate
advertising directed at children.
Thus, children’s advocates must
increasingly look to Congress, and then the Supreme Court, for hope.
In the 1980s, pressure from consumer action groups such as ACT
began to escalate again, and this time the pressure led the FCC to once
again investigate advertising to children. However, in its subsequent
report, the FCC stated that there was “no basis in the record to apply a
national mandatory quota for children’s programming.” 82 Despite the
attempts of ACT to get the FCC to limit advertising, advertising to children
was still without regulation.
This lack of regulation gave rise to one of the first direct court
challenges to children’s advertising: Action for Children’s Television v.
77.
Ramsey, supra note 42, at 382.
78.
Danny Kucharsky, Targeting Kids, MARKETING MAG., July 12, 2005, at 6.
Former Chairman Muris elaborated: “‘I think banning marketing is a distraction.
Even our dogs and cats are fat . . . and it’s not because they’re watching too much
advertising.’” Id.
79.
Orson Swindle, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Advertising Issues Before
the Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 28, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.
gov/speeches/swindle/040428aaf.htm).
80.
See Beales, supra note 74, at 880 (explaining that the FTC must recognize
that grossly overreaching regulation was not well-received in the 1970s, and,
considering the present ability of parents to control programming with technology, that
task may be better left to parents).
81.
Beales’s Remarks, supra note 58, at 14.
82.
Children’s Television Programming & Adver. Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d 634,
656 (1984).
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FCC (ACT I). 83 The court decided to uphold the FCC decision to
deregulate children’s television, effectively eliminating any enforceable
regulations on advertising to children. 84 ACT again filed suit in 1987,
challenging the deregulation decision of 1984. 85 Action for Children’s
Television v. FCC (ACT II) reversed the FCC’s earlier decision finding
This
market forces effectively regulated children’s television. 86
deregulation lasted roughly three years until increasing congressional
pressures resulted in legislation. 87 Though there have been numerous
attempts to pass legislation aimed at regulating advertising to children, the
first successful attempt was the Children’s Television Act of 1989. 88
However, the primary objective of this bill was to regulate children’s
television in general. 89 Advertising comprised only a small portion of the
bill. 90 It was, instead, focused on increasing the amount of educational

83.
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT I), 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
84.
Id. at 901 (upholding the FCC’s decision to deregulate children’s
television including lifting the limitations on advertising). The court held that the FCC
was “within the broad scope of its discretion and was adequately explained by the 1984
Order.” Id.
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT II), 821 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C.
85.
Cir. 1987).
Id. at 745–50 (examining almost all of the relevant arguments present in
86.
the debate). Finding that children do deserve a special protection, the court stated:
“In sum, we find that the Commission has failed to explain adequately the elimination
of its long-standing children’s television commercialization guidelines, and we
therefore remand to the Commission for elaboration on that issue.” Id. at 750. Before
ACT II, the FCC found that:
“commercial levels will be effectively regulated by marketplace forces . . . [and
that] if stations exceed the tolerance level of viewers . . . the market will
regulate itself. . . .” The Commission reached this overall conclusion
notwithstanding ACT’s evidence, presented in the notice-and-comment
proceedings, that market forces do not effectually regulate the commercial
content of children’s television. Indeed, the Commission’s 1984 Report failed
to address that evidence or, for that matter, even to mention the children’s
television commercialization policy.

Id. at 744 (citations omitted).
87.
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 12 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1605, 1617 (describing attempts to pass legislation regulating children’s television
advertising).
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 14.
90.
Id.
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programming and content. 91 But the regulation’s success was short-lived.
President Ronald Reagan exercised a pocket veto of the bill and ten days
later the bill was dead. 92
In the following session of Congress, the Children’s Television Act
was revived as the proposed Children’s Television Act of 1990 (CTA). 93
With the exception of state-led actions against tobacco advertising to
children, the CTA is the latest progression in the area of regulating
advertising to children. The CTA instructed the FCC to enforce
regulations for television broadcasters. 94 Specifically, the CTA required:
(1) the FCC to establish standards for broadcasters regarding the
amount of children’s television programming aired; and
(2) broadcasters to limit the amount of commercial time aired during
children’s television programs to 10.5 minutes per hour or less on
weekends and 12 minutes per hour or less on weekdays. 95

When passing the CTA, Congress considered the Supreme Court’s
willingness to limit speakers’ First Amendment protections to regulate
advertising for the purpose of protecting children, 96 as the Court did in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. 97 Importantly, Congress passed the bill on the
grounds that children have diminished capacity to understand the
persuasive aim of advertising. 98 Congress believed a balance must be
91.
Id. at 17.
92.
James J. Popham, Passion, Politics and the Public Interest: The Perilous
Path to a Quantitative Standard in the Regulation of Children’s Television
Programming, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 7 (1997) (citing Irwin Motolotsky, Reagan
Vetoes Bill Putting Limits on TV Programming for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1988,
at A1).
93.
See generally H.R. 1677, 101st Cong. (1990). The proposed act prescribed
rulemaking procedures for the FCC, set standards for compliance, and ordered the
FCC to proceed with children’s advertisement regulation process. See generally id.
94.
Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
95.
47 U.S.C. §§ 303a(a)–(b) (2006).
96.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 8–9.
97.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978) (holding that the
state’s interest in protecting children justifies special treatment and regulation of
otherwise protected expression).
98.
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 5 (1989) (noting that the FCC had, in its
1974 policy statement, concluded that “children cannot distinguish conceptually
between programming and advertising” and are “far more trusting of and vulnerable to
commercial ‘pitches’ than are adults”).
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attained between the advertising revenue necessary to support children’s
television and protection of those children from overcommercialization. 99
Unfortunately, in 1996 the FCC Task Force found that little had been
done to change children’s television since the enactment of the CTA in
The necessary balance between advertising revenue and
1990. 100
regulations was hindering meaningful progress. 101 The incentive for
broadcasters to regulate their advertisements in addition to increasing their
children’s programming was nonexistent. For these reasons, there remain
few limits on the content of advertising to children. 102
It should be mentioned that, in addition to FTC and FCC efforts to
regulate, there has been self-regulation of advertising to children. 103 Until
99.
See § 101, 104 Stat. at 996. The law notes, “the financial support of
advertisers assists in the provision of programming to children,” and that “special
safeguards are appropriate to protect children from overcommercialization on
television.” Id.
100.
See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, POLICIES AND RULES
CONCERNING CHILDREN’S TELEVISION PROGRAMMING, FCC 96-335 (1996), available
at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Orders/1996/fcc96335.htm.
101.
Id. ¶¶ 29–34.
102.
Little progress has been made on regulating advertising to children
because many of the prospective laws never make it out of Congress. For example, the
Voluntary Alcohol Advertising Standards for Children Act, H.R. 1292, 105th Cong.
(1997), was introduced to curtail advertising by the alcohol industry that appealed to
children and teens. Congress found that “[t]elevision advertising influences children’s
perception of the values and behavior that are common and acceptable in society.” Id.
§ 2. Additionally, it noted that “[t]he most popular beer ads use animated characters,
animals, or music which also amuse and attract children and teens.” Id. The reasoning
behind the bill was almost identical to the case law surrounding targeted advertising of
alcohol and tobacco to children—protection and well-being of children. Id.; see
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749–50. However, the bill did not leave the House.
The Protect Children From E-Mail Smut Act of 2001, H.R. 2472, 107th Cong. (2001),
was also enacted to protect vulnerable children. This bill was introduced to prevent
children from receiving unsolicited e-mail advertisements about sexually oriented
material. Id. § 2. Once again, the bill never left the House.
103.
In addition to self-regulation, The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has taken steps within its jurisdiction to protect consumers from advertising. See, e.g.,
Department of Health and Human Services, 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, & 807 (2009)
(detailing the reporting and labeling requirements for medical devices). In 1996, the
FDA passed an order restricting the advertising of tobacco products. Regulations
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996). The rule provided
several limitations on tobacco advertising, including limitations on the placement of
ads, the locations of billboard ads, tobacco industry involvement in sports, and the sale
of branding merchandise. Id. at 44399. The FDA promoted such a rule due to the
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1990, when the CTA was passed, the FCC was still in favor of letting the
The Children’s Advertising Review Unit
market regulate itself. 104
(CARU), which works under the Better Business Bureau and advertising
industry trade associations, monitors advertising directed to children and
advertising which it views as likely to suggest that children undertake
unsafe activities. 105 CARU has voluntary guidelines for advertising to
children under the age of twelve. 106 Furthermore, because industry selfregulation is not government action, and therefore not subject to First
Amendment protections, self-regulation may be more flexible and
aggressive at addressing concerns about children’s advertising. 107
The trend toward greater First Amendment protection for
commercial speech and government agencies’ fear of tackling regulation
for children’s advertising highlights conflicting values and priorities
between the public welfare of children and individual and commercial
expression rights. The often contradictory views of the legislative and
judicial branches create great turmoil in the ongoing discourse about
advertising to children. Despite the Supreme Court’s finding that the
protection of children is a state interest, the United States is unable to
forge new laws and regulations without the support and ingenuity of
agencies and lawmakers. 108 Yet, public pressure and federal regulation
remain the starting point and possibly the best avenue to pursue limits on
advertising to children. 109
increase in underage tobacco use and growing popularity of tobacco advertisement
figures. The FDA’s order was responsible for the removal of many popular advertising
methods and probably stemmed from the failed Senate bill to place limitations on
alcohol and tobacco advertising. See id.
104.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 3–4 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1605, 1607–08.
105.
Richard A. Kurnit, Advertising and Unfair Competition Issues, SF74 ALIABA 449, 476 (2001).
106.
CHILDREN’S ADVER. REVIEW UNIT, COUNCIL OF BETTER BUS. BUREAUS,
SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES FOR CHILDREN’S ADVERTISING 4 (2004).
107.
Beales’s Remarks, supra note 58, at 5.
108.
See Getz, supra note 54, at 1258 (“First, the FCC can be capricious, and
abandon its own longstanding rules . . . . Second, the FCC is prone to regulatory
capture . . . . Third, when the FCC doesn’t want to do something, it can delay for a
long time.”).
109.
Joseph M. Price & Rachel F. Bond, Litigation as a Tool in Food
Advertising: Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 277, 289–90 (2006)
(noting that relying on litigation “to resolve the issues raised by food advertising to
children requires courts to regulate business and juries to decide complicated issues of
health and science—tasks that are better suited to the other branches of government”).
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This Article now turns to the Supreme Court and its jurisprudence to
explore the constitutional and legal confines in which the FTC, FCC, and
Congress must adopt meaningful regulations and laws. This Article argues
for an expansion of authority by which the government may regulate
advertising aimed at children.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS: THE EVOLVING COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE
The restriction of commercial speech, even for the protection of
children, is vigorously debated in current litigation and throughout existing
jurisprudence. Just as the interests of advertisers and children clash in the
marketplace, commercial speech regulation and First Amendment rights
clash within the courts. Examining the history of speech regulation reveals
that the evolving limits on commercial speech regulation provide a better
understanding of the current debate about advertising to children.
To begin, the text of the First Amendment makes no distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech. 110 The First Amendment
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.” 111 The Framers of the Constitution left open the full meaning of
the First Amendment, leaving it to the courts and future generations to
determine the freedoms afforded to commercial speech. 112 However, “[i]t
has been clear since [the Supreme] Court’s earliest decisions concerning
the freedom of speech that the state may sometimes curtail speech when
necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest.” 113 The
balancing of freedom of speech and significant state interests is at the heart
of advertising regulation.
In the twentieth century, “[t]he Supreme Court began to distinguish
between speech which is afforded the most expansive First Amendment
protection, such as political speech, and that which is afforded less or

110.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
111.
Id. cls. 1, 2.
112.
ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16
(1941) (noting that the drafters of the First Amendment found free speech important,
but did not say much about its exact meaning). See also Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747,
749 (1993) (discussing the First Amendment failure to explain such critical words as
speech, freedom, and abridging).
113.
Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984) (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
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possibly no protection.” 114 The Constitution, the Supreme Court held,
“accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression. The protection available for
particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the
expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.” 115
The commercial speech doctrine has been a notoriously unstable and
contentious domain of American jurisprudence, 116 and the Supreme Court
Justices themselves remain divided on how to regulate commercial
speech. 117
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court provided the analytical
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of regulations on
commercial speech. 118 The regulation must survive a four-part test. 119 As a
threshold matter, the court must first inquire if the communication is
“misleading” or “related to unlawful activity.” 120 If it is not misleading or
unlawful, the inquiry continues. 121 “The State must assert a substantial
interest to be achieved by restriction on commercial speech,” “the
restriction must directly advance the state interest involved,” and the
restriction must not be “more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.” 122 The next section will discuss this test in greater detail, and
demonstrate that more aggressive regulations aimed at curtailing or
prohibiting advertising to children can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
114.
Robert Sprague, Business Blogs and Commercial Speech: A New
Analytical Framework for the 21st Century, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 127, 139 (2007) (stating
that “in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, the Court provided examples of speech
which are provided no protection: ‘the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or “fighting words”—those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace’” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).
115.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (citations omitted).
116.
See generally Soontae An, From a Business Pursuit to a Means of
Expression: The Supreme Court’s Disputes Over Commercial Speech from 1942 to
1976, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 201 (2003).
117.
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 645 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 580
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 597 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118.
Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 564.
121.
See id.
122.
Id. at 564–66.
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However, both before and after Central Hudson, the Court has
developed its commercial speech doctrine. Examining this case law is
beneficial to the argument for increased regulation of advertising to
children because through examining court rulings, we can determine if
increased regulation of advertising to children is feasible in our current
legal environment. Understanding the parameters of commercial speech
precedent provides the foundation necessary for drafting new public policy.
It is essential for lawmakers to know where the courts stand on the
protection of children and commercial speech before they can create
constitutional regulations to shield children from the dangers of
advertising. Furthermore, cases such as FCC v. Pacifica Foundation and
New York v. Ferber provide the legal validation for arguing that the
government’s protection of children is a state interest. 123 Through an
examination of case law relevant to commercial speech and advertising to
children, this Article provides justification for the increased regulation of
advertising to children. What follows is a brief summary of a few of the
most important commercial speech cases affecting advertising to children
since commercial speech was first recognized in 1942.
A. Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942)
In Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Supreme Court first made the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, with the
former receiving no constitutional protection. 124 Chrestensen, a citizen of
Florida, owned a former United States Navy submarine moored at a state
pier in New York’s East River, which he exhibited to spectators for
profit. 125 To promote his venture, he distributed leaflets on the streets of
New York advertising the submarine. 126 The respondent was subsequently
confronted by city police and told that distributing leaflets for commercial
gain violated the New York City Sanitary Code. 127 Chrestensen responded

123.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757–58 (1982) (holding that the
physical and emotional health of children is a compelling interest); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–51 (1978).
124.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
125.
Id. at 52–53.
126.
Id. at 53.
127.
Id. The New York law stated:
Handbills, cards and circulars.—No person shall throw, cast or distribute or
cause or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card,
booklet, placard or other advertising matter whatsoever, in or upon any street
or public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the
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by altering the handbills to include a protest announcement on one side of
the leaflet so the handbill would be considered political speech. 128 Despite
the alteration, the police prohibited the distribution of the leaflets, and the
respondent then filed suit. 129
The district and appellate courts both held that the New York City
Code banning the distribution of the leaflets was unconstitutional. 130 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court’s ruling. 131 The Court
declared that “[w]e are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.
Whether, and to what extent . . . such activity shall be adjudged a
derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative
judgment.” 132
Valentine sets the scene for our discussion of regulating advertising to
children. After Valentine, any regulation on commercial speech protecting
the nation’s children would have been permitted by the Constitution
because the Court had ruled it was within the legislature’s judgment to
decide to enact such laws. 133 However, changes in the commercial speech
doctrine through subsequent Supreme Court cases prove it is much more
difficult to create regulations on commercial speech today than
immediately following the Valentine ruling.
B. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations (1973)
Despite the ruling in Valentine, the constitutionality of regulating
commercial speech continued to be fiercely debated. 134 Thirty years later,
vestibule or any hall of any building, or in a letterbox therein; provided that
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the
delivery of any such matter by the United States postal service, or prohibit the
distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by
annual subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the lawful
distribution of anything other than commercial and business advertising
matter.

Id. at 53 n.1 (quoting New York Sanitary Code § 318).
128.
Id. at 53.
129.
Id. at 53–54.
130.
Id. at 54.
131.
Id. at 55.
132.
Id. at 54.
133.
See id.
134.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1964); Breard v.
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in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, the
Court reexamined the issue of commercial speech, this time concerning a
violation of a ban of sexual discrimination. 135 Specifically, the Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations determined that the Pittsburgh Press
violated a city ordinance by placing help-wanted advertisements classified
by gender in columns labeled “Male Interest,” “Female Interest,” and
Pittsburgh Press contended that the ordinance
“Male-Female.” 136
prohibited the newspaper from exercising its constitutional rights to
freedom of the press. 137 The Court upheld the commission’s ban on
sexually discriminatory advertising, comparing the illegality of sexual
employment discrimination in jobs-wanted advertisements to the idea that
a newspaper can constitutionally be forbidden to publish a want-ad
proposing narcotics or prostitutes. 138 It is important to note that the Court
focused primarily on advertising for illegal activities while acknowledging
there might be another context in which commercial speech 139 could
receive greater protection. 140 The Court concluded that advertisements for
illegal activities do not fall under First Amendment protection. 141 Those in
favor of regulating advertising to children can learn two lessons from
Pittsburgh Press Co. First, it can be helpful to couch arguments in favor of
regulation of commercials using the idea of nondiscrimination. That is, the
Court found the newspaper’s advertisements discriminating against men
and women to be illegal and not warranting constitutional protection. 142 If
proponents of regulation can amass evidence indicating commercials are
discriminatory against minorities and women, perhaps there is an argument
to be made in favor of regulating an advertiser’s ability to send such
discriminatory messages. Second, Pittsburgh Press Co. teaches us that
City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 625 (1951).
135.
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 378–79 (1973).
136.
Id. at 379–80.
137.
Id. at 380–81.
138.
Id. at 388, 391.
139.
Id. at 384, 385 (stating “speech is not rendered commercial by the mere
fact that it relates to an advertisement”). Instead, the Court defined commercial
speech as an expression that “did no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Id.
at 385.
140.
Id. at 388–89.
141.
See id. at 388, 391 (“We hold only that the Commission’s modified order,
narrowly drawn to prohibit placement in sex-designated columns of advertisements for
nonexempt job opportunities, does not infringe the First Amendment rights of
Pittsburgh Press.”).
142.
See id.
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advertisements for illegal activities are not protected by the First
Amendment. 143 Thus, perhaps a future avenue for increased regulation of
advertisements would be stricter FTC enforcement of such unlawful
advertisements.
C. Bigelow v. Virginia (1975)
Decades after its foundational ruling in Valentine, the Court began to
turn away from its previous commercial speech precedent. 144 Whereas
Pittsburgh Press Co. ruled on the amount of constitutional protection for
illegal speech, 145 two years later in Bigelow v. Virginia the Court clarified
the protection of commercial speech advertising for some legal activities. 146
The managing editor of a weekly newspaper circulated at the University of
Virginia—in a state where abortions were illegal—was convicted of a
misdemeanor 147 as the result of publishing a New York City organization’s
advertisement explaining the availability of abortions for young women if
they traveled to New York—where abortions were legal and there was no
residency requirement. 148 The state supreme court ruled in accordance
with prior Supreme Court commercial speech precedent, asserting that
because the abortion advertisements were commercial speech, the
advertisements were subject to unrestrained governmental regulation. 149
However, the Supreme Court reversed that ruling and granted some First
Amendment protection to legal commercial speech. 150 Furthermore, the
Court described its ruling in Valentine as “distinctly a limited one” that
merely upheld “a reasonable regulation of the manner in which
commercial advertising could be distributed.” 151
In Bigelow, we see a shift in the Court’s consideration of commercial
speech protection, thus making it more difficult to create laws regulating

143.
See id. at 388.
144.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819–22 (1975) (citing and narrowly
interpreting the holdings of several cases, from Valentine to Pittsburgh Press Co.).
145.
Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 391.
146.
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825–26.
147.
The statute at that time read, “‘[i]f any person, by publication, lecture,
advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner,
encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.’” Id. at 812–13 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960)).
148.
Id. at 812–14.
149.
Id. at 814–15.
150.
Id. at 825–29.
151.
Id. at 819.
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advertising to children. The opinion gave greater First Amendment rights
to advertisers while lessening the Court’s acquiescence to the legislature’s
control over commercial speech established in Valentine. 152 Despite
providing more protection for commercial speech, however, Bigelow did
not prohibit all regulations on commercial speech or advertising. 153
D. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. (1976)
Relying and expounding on Bigelow, one year later the Supreme
Court again considered the amount of constitutional protection that should
be given to commercial advertisements. 154 In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., a prescription drug
user and two nonprofit organizations whose members were prescription
drug users challenged, on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, a
Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacists in Virginia from advertising prices
for prescription drugs. 155 The district court decided that the statute
violated consumers’ First Amendment rights and was not adequately
justified. 156 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. 157 Relying on
Bigelow, the Court determined that purely economic speech is not
disqualified from protection under the First Amendment. 158 The Court
further declared that society has “a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information” and that “[e]ven an individual advertisement,
though entirely ‘commercial,’ may be of general public interest.” 159
Therefore, in a landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that
commercial speech regarding legal activities, even if it pertains to economic
interests, is entitled to some First Amendment protection. 160 Furthermore,

152.
See id. at 819, 825–26.
153.
See id. at 826.
154.
See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
155.
Id. at 749–50, 753.
156.
Id. at 755–56.
157.
Id. at 773.
158.
Id. at 760.
159.
Id. at 764.
160.
Id. at 771–73. International law has since refuted the Court’s decision.
See Peter Herzog, United States Supreme Court Cases in the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 903, 907–08 (1998)
(explaining that the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy was
not persuasive to the Court of Justice, which held that de minimus advertising
restrictions, such as in France, cannot be prohibited). Herzog wrote, “[t]hus, the
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Virginia State Board of Pharmacy established an intermediate level of First
Amendment protection for commercial expression. 161
The intermediate level of First Amendment protection for
commercial speech is important to consider when framing regulations for
advertising to children. Regulations for commercials directed at children
therefore are neither fully protected nor prohibited by the Court. 162
Understanding the First Amendment as a continuum allowing varying
degrees of regulation can give hope from past failures to regulate
commercial speech. For example, if a court strikes down a regulation in
favor of more First Amendment protection, that does not necessarily mean
all future regulations governing advertising to children are necessarily
unconstitutional. 163 Many child advocates are easily upset at the failure of
past regulations; however, they must keep in mind that regulations of
commercial speech exist but are not absolute.
E. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977)
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court considered the limits of
false or misleading commercial speech pertaining to legal advertising. 164
Despite an Arizona disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from publicizing
themselves by commercial means, two attorneys placed an advertisement in
a Phoenix newspaper stating that they “were offering ‘legal services at very
reasonable fees,’” and listing their fees. 165 As a result, the State Bar
intervened and imposed penalties on the attorneys for violating the state
disciplinary rule. 166 The appellants then sought review in the Supreme
Court of Arizona, arguing that the disciplinary “rule infringed their First
reference to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
did not seem to persuade the Court of Justice of the importance of completely free
advertising for the untrammeled flow of trade in a common market.” Id. at 908.
161.
See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 588 (2000) (explaining that the intermediate level
of First Amendment protection “exists somewhere between the ‘full’ First Amendment
protection extended to most noncommercial expression and the complete absence of
First Amendment protection for certain other speech, such as obscenity. Over the past
quarter-century, the level of First Amendment protection extended to commercial
speech has continued to be intermediate in nature.”) (footnotes omitted).
162.
See infra Part V.
163.
See infra Part V.
164.
See generally Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
165.
Id. at 354.
166.
Id. at 356.
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Amendment rights.” 167 The court rejected the First Amendment claims. 168
However, the United State Supreme Court reversed and declared that
Arizona’s disciplinary rule violated the First Amendment—a decision
flowing from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. 169 The Court rejected the
Arizona State Bar’s argument that advertising of legal services is inevitably
misleading “because such services are so individualized with regard to
content and quality . . . [and] . . . because the consumer of legal services is
unable to determine in advance just what services he needs.” 170 Rather, the
Court held that false, deceptive, or misleading advertising is subject to
restraint. 171 The “leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has
been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial speech
arena.” 172 The Court’s ruling in Bates provides a foundational argument
for the increased regulation of advertising to children. That is, if
advertisements to children are inherently deceptive or misleading,
according to Bates, they could be subject to regulation. 173 Therefore, Bates
provides legal justification for protecting children from deceptive
advertising.
F. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978)
The pivotal Supreme Court cases regarding commercial speech and
First Amendment protection discussed above did not directly involve the
protection of children. However, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court
specifically addressed the issue of commercial advertising affecting
children. 174 The case arose on a weekday afternoon at around two o’clock
when a radio station aired a twelve minute monologue given by humorist
George Carlin entitled “Filthy Words.” 175 In the program, Carlin related
his thoughts about words you could not say on the public airwaves and
repeated, several times, a number of colloquial expressions for sexual and

167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Id. at 367–72 (analyzing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy as the starting
point for determining whether Arizona’s ban on attorney advertising could pass
constitutional muster).
170.
Id. at 372.
171.
Id. at 383 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976)).
172.
Id.
173.
See infra Part V.
174.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
175.
Id. at 729.
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excretory activities and organs. 176 A man complained to the FCC after his
child heard the broadcast. 177 The FCC responded by issuing an order
saying that the radio station owner could be subject to administrative
sanction because the broadcast aired during a time of day when children
were likely to be in the audience and the broadcast contained what the
FCC deemed to be indecent language. 178 The court of appeals ruled the
FCC’s action was overly broad and constituted censorship 179 in violation of,
and beyond the power granted by, the United States Code. 180 However,
the Supreme Court reversed. 181 The rationale for the Court’s decision
included the belief that of all forms of communication, broadcasting has
Specifically,
“the most limited First Amendment protection.” 182
broadcasting intrudes into “the privacy of the home” and furthermore is
“uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.” 183
Therefore, the Court held protecting children from offensive expression
through special treatment of indecent broadcasting is justified. 184
The Court’s ruling in Pacifica is paramount to the argument for
increased regulation of advertising to children. In other words, the Court
established that all ears, particularly those of the youth of America, are not
With age comes
prepared to hear otherwise protected speech. 185
understanding, and, due to children’s lack of understanding, it is
manipulative and coercive to subject children to the same speech adults
hear on a regular basis. Unregulated commercial speech allows advertisers
to infiltrate the home and prey on the captive audience of children, which
is similar to what the Court found impermissible in Pacifica. 186 Thus,
commercial speech is not black and white. Rather, the Court considers
commercial speech from all perspectives, including the perspective of the
most innocent Americans—children. The Court’s ruling in Pacifica
176.
Id. at 732.
177.
Id. at 730.
178.
Id. at 730, 732.
179.
Id. at 733.
180.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (prohibiting the broadcast of “obscene,
indecent, or profane language”); 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006) (“Nothing in this chapter shall
be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over
radio. . . .”).
181.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751.
182.
Id. at 748.
183.
Id. at 748–49.
184.
Id. at 749–50.
185.
Id. at 749.
186.
See id. at 750.
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provides the underlying assumptions needed to argue for increased
regulation of advertising to children. If we believe children are a unique
and naïve audience, as the Court did, it follows that increased regulation
for their protection is necessary.
G. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission (1980)
In Central Hudson, one of the most influential Supreme Court cases
regarding commercial speech, Central Hudson Gas and Electric
Corporation challenged New York’s ban on advertising for utilities. 187 The
ban originated during a fuel shortage and required every electric utility in
the state to cease all advertising promoting electricity use because the
state’s utility system did not have enough fuel to meet demand. 188 Three
years later, when the fuel shortage eased but the ban continued, Central
Hudson challenged the ban, claiming restraint of commercial speech in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 189 The Court of
Appeals of New York upheld the prohibition on advertising, determining
that “governmental interest in the prohibition outweighed the limited
constitutional value of the commercial” advertisements. 190 However, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision. 191 In its ruling, the Court established
a four-part test for future courts to use when analyzing government
restrictions on commercial speech. 192
From the outset, courts must determine whether the speech “is
protected by the First Amendment.” 193 To pass this first prong, the speech
“must concern lawful activity and [must] not be misleading.” 194 The second
prong requires the government to have a substantial interest in regulating a
particular activity. 195 If the speech passes the first two prongs, the third
prong questions whether the regulation advances the government’s
substantial interest. 196 The fourth prong asks whether the particular
187.
(1980).
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 560
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id.
See id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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regulation is the least restrictive means of advancing the government’s
interest and whether the regulation is narrowly tailored. 197 If the speech
passes all four prongs, it is protected by the First Amendment. 198 In
Central Hudson, the Court determined the ban was more extensive than
necessary, and therefore struck it down as unlawful. 199
Central Hudson is an essential component to any proposed regulation
regarding advertising to children. That is, the Court’s ruling regarding
commercial speech regulations necessarily includes laws regarding the
protection of children. Therefore, when crafting public policy for
advertising, lawmakers must keep the Central Hudson test in mind and
cannot be overzealous in issuing regulations. The four prongs of the
Central Hudson test are the parameters in which all regulations on
advertising to children must fit. 200 If any of the prongs are not satisfied
with respect to a regulation, that regulation would therefore be
unconstitutional.
H. New York v. Ferber (1982)
New York v. Ferber is another Supreme Court case favoring the
protection of children over commercial speech rights. 201 An adult
bookstore owner was convicted under a New York statute for selling films
depicting young boys masturbating. 202 As a result, Ferber was convicted on
two counts of promoting sexual performances by children in violation of a
New York statute. 203 The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the statute violated Ferber’s First Amendment rights. 204 The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case, finding that “protecting the
197.
Id.
198.
See generally Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of
Posadas and the Birth of Change in Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44
Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483, 489–90 (1997) (explaining that the test was not
received enthusiastically on a universal level and noting that opponents of the four
prongs saw the test as too subjective for the courts to yield consistent results when
applying).
199.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
200.
See infra Part V (demonstrating the application of the Central Hudson test
to hypothetical regulations restricting advertising to children and hypothesizing that if
the regulations could not pass the four prongs of Central Hudson, increased regulation
would have no legal support).
201.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
202.
Id. at 752.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
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physical and emotional well-being of youth” is important “even when the
laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected
rights.” 205 Furthermore, the Court declared that “the care of children is a
sacred trust and should not be abused by those who seek to profit through
a commercial network.” 206
Again, the Court’s decision in Ferber provides a strong justification
for increased regulation of advertising to children. Paired with Pacifica,
the Court’s decision further explains the sacredness of the youngest
generation of citizens. Ferber shows that the Court’s previous ruling in
Pacifica was not merely a fluke or afterthought; rather, the Court considers
the protection of children a vital component of its jurisprudence. The
Court’s stance on the protection of children cannot be taken lightly, and
thus every subsequent case regarding the protection of children adds
ammunition to the arsenal for further television regulation. Although the
United States may not have laws on advertising to children as strict as
those of many other industrialized democracies, 207 Pacifica and Ferber,
along with subsequent Court rulings, 208 prove that the protection of
children is not outside the scope of the United States’ interest.
I. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. (1986)
Following the creation of the four-prong analysis in Central Hudson,
the Supreme Court applied the test to subsequent commercial speech
cases, suggesting that the test has predominance in determining the
constitutionality of commercial speech. One of the first major cases to use
the test was Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of
Puerto Rico. 209 Under a statute of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
casino gambling and advertising to tourists was legal, but no casino was
authorized to advertise to residents of the commonwealth. 210 A hotel with

205.
Id. at 757.
206.
Id. (citation omitted).
207.
See infra Part VI (discussing the regulations other nations place on
advertising).
208.
See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 879 (1997) (acknowledging
that restrictions on Internet interactions with children advanced the state interest of
protecting children, but noting that in this case, the regulations were not narrowly
tailored). The Court also acknowledged children are more at risk when it comes to
television than the Internet because an individual can choose not to enter a website,
but often television advertisements intrude upon the home undesirably. Id. at 854.
209.
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
210.
Id. at 331–32.
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a casino was fined several times for not following the statute, and finally
filed suit against the tourism company that enforced the statute. 211 The
hotel asserted that the casino advertising statute “suppressed commercial
speech in violation of the First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due
Process guaranties of the United States Constitution.” 212 The Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico upheld the statute, claiming that the limitations on
advertising to residents and not tourists were constitutional. 213
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the four-prong analysis of
Central Hudson and determined that the statute passed all four parts of the
test, thus affirming the ruling of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. 214 It
was undisputed that the commercial speech at issue—advertising of casino
gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico—concerned lawful activity
Second, the substantial
and was not fraudulent or misleading. 215
government interest behind the regulation, “as determined by the Superior
Court [was] the reduction of demand for casino gambling by the residents
of Puerto Rico.” 216 Also, the Court agreed that gambling had strong
connections with criminal activity, further indicating a sufficient
governmental interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens. 217
Third, the Court affirmed the Puerto Rico Legislature’s belief that
advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would
serve to increase the demand for the product advertised, thus passing the
third prong of Central Hudson. 218 To fulfill the fourth prong, the Court
concluded that the challenged statute and regulations were no more
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest. 219
211.
Id. at 333–34.
212.
Id. at 331.
213.
See id. at 338.
214.
Id. at 344.
215.
Id. at 340–41.
216.
Id. at 341.
217.
Id.
218.
Id. at 343.
219.
Id. Despite the Supreme Court’s yielding of power to the Legislative and
Executive branches in Posadas, the Court emphasized the importance of passing the
Central Hudson test in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). In
that case, the City of Cincinnati, motivated by a desire for an attractive appearance of
its streets, banned the distribution of commercial flyers through news racks on public
property. Id. at 412. The Supreme Court declared the ban to be in violation of the
First Amendment. Id. The rationale for the Court’s ruling was the city’s failure to pass
the fourth part of the Central Hudson test. See id. at 428. The fact that the city failed
to address its concern about news racks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or
number indicated it did not carefully calculate the regulation. Id. at 417. Because the
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Additionally, the Court reasoned that the power a government has to
“completely regulate casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power
to ban the advertising of casino gambling.” 220
Ultimately, the long-term effect of Posadas was to weaken the
commercial speech doctrine by affording deference to the states. 221 In
doing so, the Court granted greater leeway to state governments for the
regulation of advertising to children. If the State has the right to regulate
the education and domestic well-being of children, it follows that the state
also has the lesser right to regulate the intrusion of child marketers into the
privacy of the home. Thus, Posadas strengthens the argument for
increased regulation of advertising directed at our youth.
J. Board of Trustees v. Fox (1989)
Another important application of the four-part test established by
Central Hudson was the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Trustees of
the State University of New York v. Fox. 222 The University of New York
established regulations governing the use of school property and
dormitories, which banned private commercial enterprises from operating
on campus. 223 In October 1982, a sales representative for kitchenware was
conducting a products demonstration when campus police asked her to
leave. 224 After she refused, the police arrested the representative, who
then sued based on the claim that the University’s ban violated her First
Amendment rights. 225 The district court held that the speech regulations
were constitutional. 226 On appeal, the case was reversed and remanded
due to questions surrounding the fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test—that is, whether the state’s regulations were the least restrictive

ban on distributing commercial handbills in news racks did not seem to reasonably fit
the city’s goal for the aesthetics of the area, and because there was a lack of evidence to
support such a stance, the Supreme Court declared the ban unconstitutional. Id. at
430–31. With the ruling, the Court thus strengthened the Central Hudson test,
subsequently making it more difficult to regulate commercial speech and advertising to
children.
220.
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346.
221.
See Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam
and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 266–67 (1998).
222.
See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989).
223.
Id. at 471–72.
224.
Id. at 472.
225.
Id.
226.
Id.

Browne 7.0

2009]

12/10/2009 3:11 PM

Advertising to Children

101

regulation. 227 However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case yet again, thus lessening the restrictive nature of the fourth prong of
Central Hudson in favor of more regulation for commercial speech. 228 By
declining to impose a least-restrictive-means requirement, the Supreme
Court took into account the difficulty of establishing “the point when
restrictions become more extensive than their objective requires.” 229 As
such, Fox provided the legislative and executive branches with latitude in
the field of commercial speech regulation and diminished the strict
interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine established in Central
Hudson. 230
Fox gave hope to advocates of regulation because the Court granted
more power to legislatures to enact laws regarding commercial speech.
Logically, if we apply the Court’s reasoning to the regulation of advertising
to children, it follows that regulations will pass the Central Hudson test
more easily if they are subject to less scrutiny. However, as Part VII of this
Article explains, Fox was short-lived, and now the courts require a more
strict interpretation of Central Hudson. Therefore, after Fox, regulating
advertising to children may have been easier; however, it is unclear
whether that ease still exists today.
K. United States v. Playboy (2000)
In 2000, the question of how courts should balance the government
interest of protecting children against First Amendment rights again was
raised. 231 The Communications Decency Act (CDA), as discussed in Reno
v. ACLU, 232 was again under scrutiny in United States v. Playboy. 233 The
phenomenon of “signal bleed” occurs when a program not in a resident’s
cable package can be heard or seen despite the cable company’s blockage

227.
Id. at 472–73.
228.
Id. at 479–81 (stating that the Court has “not gone so far as to impose
upon [regulators] the burden of demonstrating that . . . the manner of restriction is
absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end”).
229.
Id. at 480–81.
230.
See id. at 481 (stating the Court was providing the Legislative and
Executive branches the “needed leeway in a field (commercial speech) ‘traditionally
subject to governmental regulation’”) (citation omitted).
231.
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 806–07 (2000).
232.
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (citing U.S. CONST. amend.
I) (holding that the “statute abridges ‘the freedom of speech’ protected by the First
Amendment”).
233.
Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 806.
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of a channel. 234 The CDA required cable television providers to only
transmit channels with sexually explicit adult programming between 10
p.m. and 6 a.m. or to fully block those channels, even during the eight-hour
period at night when children would be unlikely to see the signal bleed. 235
Playboy Entertainment Group filed suit, claiming First Amendment
violations because the statute was “unnecessarily restrictive content-based
legislation.” 236 Despite acknowledging the compelling government interest
of protecting children, the district court ruled that the regulations were too
restrictive in nature and therefore unconstitutional. 237 Similarly, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision, once again declaring that the
regulations were not the least restrictive method available to protect
Because the regulations were not sufficiently narrowly
children. 238
tailored, the restriction of speech was not adequately justified and
therefore was not permitted by the First Amendment. 239
The implications of Playboy are great for our consideration of
advertising to children. Most importantly, the Court reestablished in the
twenty-first century the idea that the United States government has a
substantial interest in protecting children. Although the Court often cites
the state interest of the safety of children, Court rulings do not always
remain static. However, through the history of the commercial speech
doctrine, it is clear that the Court considers the protection of children to be
a high and unwavering priority. 240 The Court’s recent rulings seem to
234.
Id.
235.
Id.
236.
Id. at 807.
237.
Id. at 809–10.
238.
Id. at 827. The Central Hudson test was not applied to the speech
regulations because the regulation was a content-based speech restriction and could
stand only if it satisfied strict scrutiny, which both the district and Supreme Court
applied. Id. at 813. This case required the least restrictive means for regulations,
whereas the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson requires only a proper fit
between the means and the end.
239.
Id.
240.
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that the
Communications Decency Act of 1996—regulating transmission of indecent
communications using telecommunications devices—could be constitutionally valid if
modified slightly); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding child
pornography will not receive First Amendment protection as long as conduct is
sufficiently defined by state law); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747, 749 (1978)
(upholding FCC decision that radio broadcast of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words”
monologue was indecent and prohibited in part because it was uniquely accessible to
children).
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indicate that protecting children is here to stay. Thus, the current legal
atmosphere in the United States is ripe for further regulation of advertising
when such advertising is specifically directed at children. However, an
important lesson that child advocates can learn from the Court’s decision in
Playboy is the essentiality of narrowly tailoring all regulations on
commercial speech. Protecting children may be important, but recognizing
that adults have the necessity of information in advertisements will be
paramount to the specific tailoring of any child advertising regulation.
L. Summary
The Court has been divided through the decades on the question of
how much constitutional protection to grant commercial speech. Despite
the Court’s creation of the Central Hudson framework in 1980, the Court
has subsequently applied the four-prong test in a variety of ways. 241 What
remains clear is that the Court has consistently ruled that the government
has a substantial interest in protecting the safety and well-being of its
citizens, so long as the regulations conform to the Central Hudson test.
Overall, case law has attempted to handle advertising to children in a very
selective way. Most cases do not directly attack questions about the legal

241.
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (reflecting the
Court’s ruling for greater protection for commercial speech). Upon the Supreme
Court’s application of the Central Hudson test, the regulations desired in Lorillard did
not stand. Id. at 554. The third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson were not
satisfied. Id. at 566. Specifically, the state failed to provide conclusive evidence for
how regulations advanced the state interest. Id. The regulations also failed the fourth
prong because they were not narrowly tailored. Id. Therefore, when considering
advertising to children, it is imperative that all regulations be adequately justified with
evidence and are narrowly tailored to advance the state interest of protecting children.
See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). In 44 Liquormart,
the Court ruled that the regulation of commercial speech in question failed the third
and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test. Specifically, although Rhode Island
believed the statute furthered the state interest of reducing alcohol consumption, the
state provided no empirical evidence suggesting advertising prices of alcohol (the issue
at hand in the case) would lead to significantly greater alcohol consumption. Id. at
506–07. Furthermore, the Rhode Island regulation was not the least restrictive means
to support temperance, so it was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 507–08. Therefore, the
Supreme Court declared Rhode Island’s regulations unconstitutional after failing the
Central Hudson test. Id. at 508. See also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173, 188–90 (1999) (concluding the laws limiting advertisement of
casinos failed the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test). Although there
was a state interest in reducing the amount of gambling by citizens, no substantial
evidence was given that the regulations advanced the state interest. 44 Liquormart
Inc., 517 U.S. at 507–08.
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nature of this advertising, but rather address specific, pointed questions
regarding specific regulations. There have been, and are, powerful
interests involved on both sides of this debate. Industry giants and special
interest groups are all putting up a significant fight and at this point in time,
no side has been declared a clear winner.
As the Supreme Court continually professes the importance of
protecting children, perhaps United States public policy will soon coalesce
with the values expressed by the Justices. The Court’s rulings in cases
balancing the protection of children against commercial speech give hope
that one day soon the United States will follow the lead of Canada and the
European nations that protect the innocence of children. However, as the
following section demonstrates, governmental agencies and the legislative
branch have been unsuccessful and unwilling in past attempts to protect
America’s youth.
V. TAKING THE TEST: CHILD ADVERTISING REGULATIONS UNDER
CENTRAL HUDSON
The Central Hudson test is the analysis that determines whether the
government may constitutionally ban certain types or forms of
advertising. 242 In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court established a fourprong test for evaluating whether a governmental regulation over
commercial speech is protected. 243 By applying the four-part test to
hypothetical regulations of advertising to children, we can predict whether
further protection of children through advertising restrictions will be held
to be constitutionally protected.
First, the Central Hudson test is applicable only to regulations that
pertain to communication that is neither misleading nor unlawful—
commercial speech that is misleading or unlawful is not protected by the
First Amendment, and thus the Central Hudson test does not apply to such
speech. 244 Without dispute, the sale of consumer goods, toys, food, and
services to children is legal. While certain products or commercials may be
deemed inappropriate for children, they are not illegal.

242.
Despite disagreement among some Supreme Court Justices about
applying the test in 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517–18, the Central Hudson test is still
widely used when determining whether a governmental regulation on commercial
speech is constitutional.
243.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
244.
Id. at 566.
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While this first prong of the test is the least litigated, there is a
growing push for the court to reevaluate its assumption that the
advertisements are not themselves misleading, especially when they are
focused on more vulnerable audiences, such as children. “If Congress were
to pass [] proposed legislation based on its conclusion that product
placement and celebrity spokes-character marketing in children’s media
were misleading or deceptive, the Supreme Court would likely uphold the
restrictions under the first prong of the Central Hudson test.” 245 The
Court’s basic assumption in its evaluation of what is “misleading”—that
children are similar to adults—is flawed, and requires a more thorough and
complete exploration.
Second, the state must demonstrate a substantial interest. 246
Furthermore, the substantial state interest cited must be justified through
substantial evidence. 247 Regulations on advertising to children satisfy the
245.
Angela J. Campbell, Restricting the Marketing of Junk Food to Children
by Product Placement and Character Selling, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 447, 492 (2006).
246.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. See also Langvardt, supra note 161, at 600
(explaining the ease at which the government has been able to establish the second
prong of Central Hudson). Langvardt explains that the government has been able to
easily establish this second prong by citing a number of cases: Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 186 (1999) (showing a “substantial
government interest in reducing social ills associated with gambling”); 44 Liquormart,
Inc., 517 U.S. at 504 (finding a “substantial government interest in reducing public’s
consumption of alcoholic beverages”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485
(1995) (holding there is a “substantial government interest in guarding against ‘strength
wars’ among producers of alcoholic beverages”); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509
U.S. 418, 423, 426, 428 (1993) (finding “substantial government interest in
accommodating competing public policies of lottery and non-lottery states”); Edenfield
v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768–69 (1993) (finding a “substantial government interest in
protecting public against fraud by certified public accountants”); City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 414, 416–18 (1993) (finding a “substantial
government interests in enhancing safety on, and aesthetics of, public property”); Bd.
of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989) (finding substantial
government interests in promoting sound educational environment at a state university
and in protecting students against manipulative sellers of products); Posadas de P.R.
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (finding a “substantial government
interest in reducing demand for casino gambling and thereby minimizing related social
ills”); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71–75 (1983) (finding a
“substantial government interest in helping parents maintain control over when and
how to expose their children to sensitive subjects”); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568–69
(finding “substantial government interests in promoting energy conservation and in
attempting to ensure that utility rates are fair”). Id. at 600 n.90.
247.
See generally O. Lee Reed, Is Commercial Speech Really Less Valuable
Than Political Speech? On Replacing Values and Categories in First Amendment
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second prong of Central Hudson because the government has a wellestablished and compelling interest in protecting children, recognized by
the Court in the aforementioned case law. Generally, courts have
recognized two compelling government interests in regards to children.
First, the government has an interest in assisting parents in the supervision
and rearing of their children. 248 Second, the government has an interest in
shielding minors from physical and psychological abuse. 249 Furthermore, a
House of Representatives bill indicates that “it is difficult to think of an
interest more substantial than the promotion of the welfare of children.” 250
Thus, the government can advance interests to be served by regulating
advertising to children sufficiently to satisfy the second part of the Central
Hudson test. 251

Jurisprudence, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 31 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s increased
concern with providing evidence for commercial speech to be restricted).
248.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (upholding regulation of
material that was obscene for children but not for adults and stating that it is proper for
the state to enact laws to help parents protect their children’s well-being).
249.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
250.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 11 (1991), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1605,
1616.
251.
See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (providing an
example of the proper evidence and justification needed to pass the second prong of
Central Hudson). The Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson test to a Florida Bar
Association ban on personal injury lawyers sending direct-mail advertisements to
victims and their relatives for thirty days following an accident. See id. at 620, 623.
John Blakely and a lawyer referral service that often distributed such advertisements
filed suit claiming First Amendment infringement. Id. at 621. The first prong was not
disputed because sending direct-mail advertisements was neither unlawful nor
misleading. Id. at 623–24. For the second prong, the Supreme Court ruled the Bar had
a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims
and their loved ones and this substantial interest was well within the police powers of
the state. Id. at 625. In support of its argument that its interest was substantial, the Bar
submitted a 106-page summary of its two-year study of lawyer advertising, which
contained both statistical and anecdotal data about the public views of soliciting
families in the wake of an accident. Id. at 626. Twenty-seven percent of recipients of
direct-mail advertising reported their regard for the legal profession as a whole was
lowered as a result of receiving the direct mail. Id. at 627. In the end, the regulation
passed all four prongs of Central Hudson and the Court upheld the regulation as
constitutional. Id. at 635. However, without all of the detailed material evidence used
to prove the second prong of Central Hudson, it is questionable whether the
regulations would have passed. That is why in the debate over advertising to children,
statistical and anecdotal evidence regarding the effects of advertising to children is
necessary to demonstrate that the state has an interest in the protection of children.
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Despite the ease of fulfilling the first two prongs of the Central
Hudson test, the most difficult constitutional hurdles arise when such
regulations are examined under the third and fourth prongs. The third
prong requires the government to show that the restrictions directly
advance the government’s substantial interest. 252 In recent years, the Court
has applied stricter scrutiny of regulation and required more firm evidence
than in previous applications of Central Hudson. 253 For instance, the Court
struck down restrictions in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island and Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States partly because the
Court was not convinced that limiting such advertising actually reduced
consumption of the underlying products. 254 However, in the case of
restrictions on advertising to children, hypothetical regulations appear to
pass the third prong. For instance, a regulation limiting the amount of
commercial time during programs aimed at children would substantially
reduce the amount of commercial material viewed by children, thus
furthering the government’s interests to a material degree. The data
indicates that children watch more television on weekdays than on
252.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
253.
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505–08 (1996)
(stating that the Court was unable to find that a price advertising ban significantly
advanced the State’s interest without evidentiary support). Daniel E. Troy observed
that in 44 Liquormart, “even those Justices explicitly relying on the four-factored
Central Hudson test appeared to apply stricter scrutiny . . . in the case than the Central
Hudson test often requires.” Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech,
16 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 140 (1999); see also Michael Hoefges & Milagros RiveraSanchez, “Vice” Advertising Under the Supreme Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine:
The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 345, 372 (2001)
(noting that the Court significantly tightened the third and fourth factors of the Central
Hudson test in 44 Liquormart and other cases that followed); Sean P. Costello,
Comment, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before and
After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 748 (1997)
(“[I]t appears that the Court is now inclined to place commercial speech closer to the
core of protected speech in some circumstances.”).
254.
Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176,
189 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 505–07. Other writers have observed the
Court moving toward a more stringent application of the commercial speech tests by
requiring proof of the third part of the Central Hudson test. See William D. O’Neill,
Governmental Restrictions on Beverage Alcohol Advertising After 44 Liquormart v.
Rhode Island, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 267, 279–82 (1998); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap
Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, SUP. CT. REV.
123, 124, 138–45 (1996); Marrie K. Stone, Note, The Price Isn’t Right: 44 Liquormart
Inc. v. Rhode Island Promotes Free Speech in Commercial Advertising, 18 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 133, 152–53 (1997).
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weekends, 255 so a hypothetical regulation could require fewer commercials
during weekday programming than on the weekends. This too would
reduce the number of commercials that children view during children’s
programming, thus advancing the government’s interest of protecting
children. When considering whether regulations for advertising directed at
children should be permitted under the third prong, it is appropriate to
question the nature of information and the effects that the information has
on society. 256 If the government further regulated advertising to children,
the regulations would seem to directly advance the government’s interest
in protecting the children, especially considering the evidence detailing the
psychological and physical effects of advertising on children.
Although the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test does not
require the government to use the least restrictive means possible, 257
regulations that are substantially more restrictive than necessary fail the
last requirement. 258 Therefore, when considering prospective regulations
for advertising to children, there should be a reasonable fit between the
means and ends. 259 Although a full ban of advertising to children like the
bans in Sweden and Norway would not appear to be the least restrictive
means, 260 lesser regulations would substantially further the government’s
interest while providing a justifiable means to that end. Hypothetical
regulations would not be imposed during times when the FTC finds that
children do not watch much television, so adults would be able to access
commercial information during adult programs. In addition, “regulating
commercials aimed at children, and not just those aired during shows
aimed at children, would conform to the Court’s policy against restricting
the content of speech available to adults in order to make the speech
appropriate for children.” 261
255.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-385, at 20 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1605.
256.
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569.
257.
See id. at 570–71.
258.
See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)
(stating that it had “not gone so far as to impose . . . the burden of demonstrating . . .
that the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired
end. What our decisions require is a fit between the legislature’s ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends—a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable
. . .” (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341
(1986))) (internal quotations omitted).
259.
See id; see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (noting that the regulation
must not be more extensive than necessary).
260.
See infra Part VI.B.
261.
See Ramsey, supra note 42, at 388.
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In the more recent case of Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, the Supreme
Court considered regulations that limited tobacco advertising. 262 The case
is important here because of the similarities between tobacco advertising
and fast food advertising to children. For example, Lorillard provides a
window into the Court’s analysis using Central Hudson’s four-part test. 263
The regulations in Lorillard prohibited tobacco advertisements within
1,000 feet of a school and regulated the height of in-store displays. 264 The
first two parts of the Central Hudson test were not in dispute—smoking
was legal, the advertisements were accurate, and the public’s health was a
substantial state interest. 265 The case was decided on the final two prongs:
whether the regulations directly advanced this state interest, and whether
the regulations were too restrictive or “more extensive than necessary.” 266
The Court held that the regulations were too broad in that they restricted
the right of adults to view the advertisements. 267 Specifically, the Court
noted that “‘the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech
addressed to adults.’” 268 The Court failed to consider all of the other
avenues that tobacco advertisers had to reach an adult audience. 269 The
restriction was hardly a total ban, yet the Court found it too restrictive. 270
For instance, “[a] ban on the use of cartoon characters and celebrities
in commercials aimed at children would not present the same issues that the
Court found impermissible in cases such as Lorillard Tobacco, because
such a ban would not significantly deny adults access to truthful
information concerning commercial decisions.” 271 Nor would a hypothetical
ban forbid consumer access to companies’ websites, informational material,
or product reviews; thus, the regulation should not appear too excessive.
Further regulations would not prevent adults from receiving adequate
information. Instead, companies would be required to make complete
disclosures regarding their products, and to advertise this information in a

262.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
263.
Id. at 554–70.
264.
Id. at 536.
265.
Id. at 555.
266.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566,
569–70 (1980).
267.
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 565–66.
268.
Id. at 564 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997)).
269.
See id. at 561–66.
270.
See id. at 565–66.
271.
See Ramsey, supra note 42, at 388.
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manner that is less misleading to children.
Therefore, increased hypothetical governmental regulations on
advertising to children may pass the Court’s four-prong Central Hudson
test. Because of the Court’s continued reliance on Central Hudson, it is
imperative for anyone seeking to protect children through advertising
regulation to determine if the specific regulation meets the four-part
criteria. Because this Article does not propose a specific regulatory
framework, but rather offers a broadly defined hypothetical example, it
does not necessarily follow that every attempt to regulate advertising to
children will successfully pass the Central Hudson test. New developments
in law and public policy will ultimately determine the bounds of Central
Hudson and how easily regulations can pass the test. However, regulators
cannot neglect the current Court’s specific interest in providing concrete
and substantial evidence for the third and fourth parts of the test. For any
regulation on advertising to children to pass, the necessity of such evidence
remains undeniable.
VI. EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN APPROACHES TO REGULATING
ADVERTISING DIRECTED AT CHILDREN
Our vision and our imagination extend only as far as our experience
permits. If all we know is American law, we prevent ourselves from
discovering insights that have developed elsewhere. Compared to several
other industrialized countries, the United States lacks substantive
regulations of advertising directed at children. 272 Throughout history,
other nations have looked to the United States as a leader in constitutional
law and public policy. When examining advertising law in other nations,
however, it becomes evident that the United States has adopted a relatively
laissez-faire approach compared to other industrialized democracies. 273
A. Canadian Commercial Speech—Advertising Ban in Quebec
Canada lends itself to a comparative study with the United States
because the two nations share many similarities in public policy and
jurisprudence. 274 When regulating advertising, Canada is most notable

272.
See Ross D. Petty, Advertising Law and Social Issues: The Global
Perspectives, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 309, 314–21 (1994).
273.
See id.
274.
See Seymour Martin Lipset, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES AND
INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, xvii (1990) (“[I]t is precisely
because the two North American democracies have so much in common that they
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because of a 1980 legislative ban on nearly all commercial advertising to
children under the age of thirteen in the province of Quebec. 275 This ban
on advertising to children also deserves special notice because it was the
first such law in the twentieth century. 276
When enacting the ban, the major concern was for the vulnerability of
children, because they were thought to be easily misled and deceived and
not reasonably capable of self-protection. 277 Lawmakers were particularly
concerned about the health of children. 278 The specific regulations of the
Quebec ban are as follows:
Subject to what is provided in the regulations, no person may make use
of commercial advertising directed at persons under thirteen years of
age. To determine whether or not an advertisement is directed at
persons under thirteen years of age, account must be taken of the
context of its presentation, and in particular of
(a) the nature and intended purpose of the goods advertised;
(b) the manner of presenting such advertisement;
(c) the time and place it is shown. 279

To apply the above regulations and to help advertisers understand the
above criteria, the Office of Consumer Protection created guidelines to
follow when broadcasting advertisements on television. The chart below
illustrates the guidelines:

permit . . . insights into the factors that cause variations.”).
275.
See Attorney Gen. of Que. v. Irwin Toy, Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 938
(Can).
276.
See CORRINA HAWKES, WORLD HEALTH ORG., MARKETING FOOD TO
CHILDREN: THE GLOBAL REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 20 (2004) (referencing bans
on advertising to children in Sweden since 1991, Norway since 1992, and Quebec since
1980).
277.
See Attorney Gen. of Que., [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 987 (restating the rationale
for the ban on advertising to children as “[t]he concern . . . for the protection of a group
which is particularly vulnerable to techniques of seduction and manipulation abundant
in advertising”).
278.
See Jeffery, supra note 45, at 239, 239 n.12.
279.
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., ch. P-40.1, §§ 248–49 (2009) (Can.),
available at http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-p-40.1/latest/rsq-c-p-40.1.html.
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Summary of Commercial Advertising Regulation 280

Definition

Products and
Services
Exclusively
Intended for
Children.
Includes: toys,
some sweets, and
food products.

Can I
Advertise
During
Children’s
Programs?

NEVER unless
treatment of the
advertisement is
not likely to
interest children.

Can I
Advertise
During
Programs
Other Than
Children’s
Programs?

Products and
Services with a
Marked Appeal
for Children.
Includes:
“family”
products, and
products for
teenagers: some
cereals, desserts,
and games.

NEVER unless
treatment of
the
advertisement
is not likely to
interest
children.
Only if the
Only if the
advertisement is
advertisement
“not designed to” is not designed
appeal
to appeal
particularly to
particularly to
the instinctual
the instinctual
needs of children needs of
so as to arouse
children so as
their interest.”
to arouse their
interest.”

Products and
Services with
No Appeal for
Children

Always, but
the
commercial
must be
treated for
adults.
Always, but
the
commercial
must be
treated for
adults.

Despite opposition to the Quebec restrictions on advertising, the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the ban on advertising to children, ruling

280.
Jeffery, supra note 45, at 242. The chart summarizes Office de la
Protection du Consummateur, Regulation Respecting the Application of Consumer
Protection Act (2004) (Can.), which is an English version of the guide that discusses
sections 248–249 of the Consumer Protection Act.
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that the restrictions were an acceptable regulation of commercial freedom
in Attorney General of Québec v. Irwin Toy, Ltd. 281 Specifically, the Court
found that:
the objective of regulating commercial advertising directed at children
accords with a general goal of consumer protection legislation, viz. to
protect a group that is most vulnerable to commercial manipulation . . .
[is] reflected in general contract doctrine. Children are not as
equipped as adults to evaluate the persuasive force of advertising and
advertisements directed at children would take advantage of this. 282

The Irwin Toy Court used the prior framework established by Canada’s
Supreme Court in R. v. Oakes to determine the constitutionality of the
statutory restriction on commercial advertising directed at children. 283
In Oakes, the Canadian Supreme Court created a framework for
future courts to use when restricting speech, and that framework bears
similarity to the Central Hudson test used in the United States. 284 First, all
restrictions on commercial speech in Canada require a decision on whether
the limitation is worthy enough to override the constitutionally protected
commercial speech. 285 Next, the court must inquire whether the method
281.
Attorney Gen. of Que., [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1004–05.
282.
Id. at 990 (citations omitted).
283.
See id. at 933; see also The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can). In
addition to the Oakes ruling, the court relied heavily on a 1981 United States Federal
Trade Commission Final Staff Report and Recommendation, which found that
children do not perceive bias in advertising and their life experience is insufficient to
help them counter-argue when confronted with advertisements. See Attorney Gen. of
Que., [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 994–1000. Furthermore, children are not able to evaluate
child-oriented advertising because commercials enhance the product through
persuasive means. ELLIOT ET AL., supra note 36, at 25.
284.
Oakes and Central Hudson are similar, but differ greatly in the first step
of the process. In Canada, all speech is considered worthy of protection, and,
therefore, all speech has the chance to be reviewed regardless of legality. On the other
hand, in the United States, courts first determine whether the speech in question is
legal and protected under the First Amendment. Compare Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at
138–40 (requiring a governmental measure to be of sufficient importance and the
means employing it reasonable and justified), with Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1986) (holding that to be regulated, speech
must be found to be in a category subject to government regulation and that regulation
must advance a substantial government interest).
285.
The Queen v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 768 (Can.)
(reiterating the Oakes analysis and further asserting that in order to pass the first step
of Oakes, the restriction placed upon the speech “must bear on a ‘pressing and
substantial concern’”) (citation omitted).
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and process used to achieve the objective are proportional to the
objective. 286 Because of the difficulty in determining proportionality, the
court must consider whether the process used to restrict speech is rationally
linked to the objective, whether the process impedes a constitutional right
as little as possible, and whether the detrimental effects of the method used
to achieve the objective are proportional to the salutary effects. 287 Since
the Court’s ruling in Oakes, the framework has been applied specifically to
disputes governing the regulation of commercial speech directed at
children, including to hold the Quebec ban on advertising to children
constitutional. 288
B. European Solutions
Similar to Canada, many European nations also regulate advertising
to children more rigorously and strictly than does the United States.
Within the European Union, no uniform advertising law exists pertaining
to children, but each member state oversees its individual regulation.
Although there is no uniform standard, most regulations fit within two
broad categories. The first concerns the scheduling of advertising, which
relates to the “timing, frequency, and the amount of advertising aimed at
children.” 289 The second category of regulations concerns the content of
advertising, which places restrictions on advertisements for specific
products such as toys, food, and medicines. 290 It is important to note that
these regulations are not limited to television advertising, though that is
their primary aim. The regulations also control sponsorships, children’s
clubs, and other means of directing advertising at children. 291
The different regulatory schemes reflect the various value systems
among European nations. 292 There are three predominant and related
values that underlie European recognition of children as potentially
vulnerable to commercial advertising: (1) “respect for children’s

286.
Id.
287.
Id.; see also Rocket v. Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232,
249–50 (Can.).
288.
Attorney Gen. of Que. v. Irwin Toy, Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 999 (Can.).
289.
GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 142.
290.
See id.
291.
Id. at 143.
292.
See generally Brian Young et al., Attitudes of Parents Towards Advertising
to Children in the UK, Sweden and New Zealand, 19 J. MARKETING MGMT. 475 (2003)
(tracking cultural attitudes towards advertising to children in the United Kingdom,
Sweden, and New Zealand).
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developing educational needs,” (2) “fairness, or not exposing children to
sophisticated advertising messages before they develop awareness of
persuasion,” and (3) “avoidance of exposure to adult content.” 293
Some nations restrict the type of commercials directed at children,
while others restrict the hours advertisers may utilize. For instance, in
Belgium, all advertisements are banned within “five minutes before and
after commercial-free programs for children under 12.” 294 Austria takes the
regulation even further, banning all advertisements during children’s
programs before 8:15 p.m. 295 German law also prohibits advertising breaks
in children’s programming and completely bans corporate sponsorship of
programs directed at children. 296 On the other hand, Greece bans toy
commercials between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. and allows no
advertisements for war toys during any time of programming. 297 With its
unique law, “Finland mandates that children in commercials may not talk
about the products [being advertised] and can only appear in a ‘passive
role’ in advertisements for sweets.” 298 In France, famous people may not
appear in advertising to children, nor may they present any sort of sales
pitch, or even wear colors associated with a specific brand. 299 The
Netherlands requires that a toothbrush be pictured in all candy
advertising. 300 Certainly, the creative regulations European nations use to
protect their children deserve careful consideration in the United States.
As demonstrated in Europe, the possibilities for regulating advertising are
endless; with many foreign regulations as working examples, crafting a
public policy catered specifically to the needs of the United States is
possible.
The strongest regulations for advertisements directed at children can
be found in Sweden. In Sweden, consumers are assumed to be vulnerable
293.
GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 142 (citing J. BLUMLER, TELEVISION AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: VULNERABLE VALUES IN WESTERN EUROPE (1992)).
294.
Janice H. Kang, Barbie Banished from the Small Screen: The Proposed
European Ban on Children’s Television Advertising, 21 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 543, 547
(2001); see also GUNTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 140 (indicating the same five-minute
limitation before and after children’s programs).
295.
Kang, supra note 294, at 547.
296.
James Geary, Childhood’s End?, TIME INT’L. ED., Aug. 2, 1999.
297.
Kang, supra note 294, at 545.
298.
Id. at 547.
299.
Laurel Wentz, Next Challenge: Re-regulation, ADVER. AGE, Sept. 10,
1990, at 59.
300.
J.J. Boddewyn, Advertising Regulation in The 1980s: The Underlying
Global Forces, 46 J. MARKETING. 27, 28 (1982).
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in the marketplace; therefore, protecting the consumer is considered to be
the job of the government. 301 Unlike in the United States, in Sweden
public policy acknowledges that “there exist large groups of consumers
who, owing to low incomes, deficient education and knowledge of the
market, etc., are less well equipped than the average citizen for their role as
consumers.” 302 Swedish laws ban all television advertising targeting
children below the age of twelve. 303 The ban includes not only toy
advertisements, but also commercials for foods high in fat and sugar such
as sweets and fast food. 304 In other words, advertisements for the products
can be aired if the targets of the advertisements are not children. 305 For
example, commercials for toys, sweets, and foods high in fat may be aired
only if the advertisements are designed to attract and inform adults as
opposed to children. 306 What may surprise many Americans 307 is that
301.
See Ulf Bernitz, Consumer Protection: Aims, Methods, and Trends in
Swedish Consumer Law, 20 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN L. 26, 28 (1976) (indicating that
the trend in Sweden and other Nordic countries is to leave consumer protection to the
state).
302.
Id. at 14.
303.
7 ch. 4 § The Radio and Television Act (SFS 1996:844) (“Commercial
advertising in a television broadcast may not be designed to attract the attention of
children under 12 years of age.”).
304.
Nick Higham, Industry Divided over Prospect of Ban on Children’s
Advertising, MARKETING WK., July 8, 1999, at 17.
305.
Richard Tomkins, Selling to a Captivated Market, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 23,
1999, available at PROQUEST, doc. ID 40779788.
306.
See id.
307.
The surprise derives from the fact that Americans are characterized by an
intense individualism not common in European nations like Sweden. See EVERETT
CARLL LADD, THE AMERICAN IDEOLOGY: AN EXPLORATION OF THE ORIGINS,
MEANING, AND ROLE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS 3–22 (1994) (explaining that
there are vast differences between Americans and Europeans when it comes to
individualism).
The United States’ support of children as they enter higher education or the
workplace is inadequate in comparison to European nations, including Sweden. See
Thomas D. Cook & Frank Furstenberg, Jr., Explaining Aspects of the Transition to
Adulthood in Italy, Sweden, Germany, and the United States: A Cross-Disciplinary,
Case Synthesis Approach, 580 ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 272 (2002). The
authors performed a comparative study of assistance provided to teenagers in many
nations including the United States. Id. at 258. In Sweden, the state and businesses
cooperate to help train young people for jobs. Id. at 267. The future workers are
supported after high school to study at a university or to learn to work, with
the clear expectation that this support is for promoting self-reliant individuals
and active citizens . . . [w]hen unemployment occurs, past work will be
rewarded but prolonged inactivity will not, though enough is provided to keep
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almost ninety percent of Swedish advertising professionals are in favor of
the ban on advertising to children. 308 —they recognize advertising to
children as misleading because children do not understand the commercial
nature and purpose of advertising. 309 Similarly, Norway has content-based
regulation for protecting children which is as strict as Sweden’s ban. The
Norwegian ban broadly states that “[a]dvertisements may not be broadcast
in connection with children’s programmes, nor may advertisements be
specifically directed at children.” 310
Studying laws of other industrialized nations on advertising to
children gives legal scholars, politicians, and regulators in the United States
the opportunity to explore the many possibilities available when shaping
the contours of future commercial speech regulation. By examining the
various strengths and weaknesses of policy in other nations, the best
approach can be formulated. Canada, Sweden, Norway, and other
European nations pave the way for the increased protection of children in
the twenty-first century, providing the United States with models of
possible regulation and of possible balances between free speech and the
need for regulation.
VII. COUNTERARGUMENTS: THE NECESSITY OF ROBUST COMMERCIAL
SPEECH PROTECTIONS
Because Congress and the Court have yet to take a definite stance on
regulating advertising to children, the debate continues. However, before
one can determine whether a regulation falls within the bounds of
constitutionality, one must define those bounds. Therein lies the problem.
The bounds of the First Amendment to protect speech can be defined in
two ways: (1) as a positive grant of power, or (2) as a negative limitation
on government authority. 311 Proponents of regulation subscribe to the first
life and limb together.

Id. at 272. Conversely, in the United States “the main assumption is that individuals
should get ahead by themselves by virtue of their own willpower and initiative,
provided that the institutions are in place from which they can benefit, primarily
schools and colleges.” Id. at 282.
308.
Roger Harrabin, A Commercial Break for Parents, INDEPENDENT (U.K.),
Sept. 8, 1998, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/acommercial=break-for-parents-1196811.html.
309.
Id.
310.
Broadcasting Act of 4 Dec. 1992, No. 127, Sec. 3-1 (Norway).
311.
See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments,
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1258–59 (1994) (exploring whether the
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position. Opponents of regulation reject this affirmative interpretation of
the First Amendment. They perceive the Amendment’s function as a
limitation on government power. 312 The words “[C]ongress shall make no
law” are interpreted as an express limit on the government’s ability to
Under this interpretation, the First
regulate political speech. 313
Amendment does not grant the government any authority to regulate
political speech. 314 The struggle between the positive power of the
government and the negative limitation on government authority set the
scene for opposing viewpoints on regulating advertising to children.
For the most part, those arguing in favor of regulations for advertising
directed at children make this basic argument: Well-educated and
informed children are essential for the promulgation of our nation and
government. Children are not miniature adults, and they do not interpret
and process information in the same manner as adults. Thus, children
deserve special protection. 315 The argument focuses mainly on the amount
First Amendment can be conceptualized as a positive grant of power).
312.
See Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and
Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 76 (1997) (“The plain purpose of the First
Amendment was to limit the authority of the government to regulate speech.”); see
also Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, in
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 225 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992)
(interpreting the purpose of the First Amendment to be protecting liberty of
expression from government interference).
313.
Smith, supra note 312, at 66 (noting that the “very language . . .
government ‘shall not’ act, makes clear” that public debate was to be achieved by
protecting liberty interests from government interference). Allowing an “activist
government” to promote public debate would thus be inconsistent with the
Amendment’s principle. See Wanda Franz & James Bopp, Jr., The Nine Myths of
Campaign Finance Reform, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 64 (1998). The first myth,
according to Franz and Bopp, is: “The First Amendment is a Loophole Which Should
be Narrowed or Closed.” Id. The authors debunk this myth by arguing that the
purpose of the First Amendment is to protect free speech and not to promote public
debate. Id. The Amendment is thus not a loophole that needs to be closed; it should
be as wide open as possible for it is “a guardian of our citizens’ freedom” and a
“safeguard[] not only [of] free speech, but [of] our entire system of representative selfgovernment.” Id.
314.
See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (noting the importance of preserving the First Amendment right to free
speech because it allows citizens to “praise, criticize or discuss . . . all governmental
policies” under the auspices of the Constitution).
315.
See Angela J. Campbell, Ads2Kids.com: Should Government Regulate
Advertising to Children on the World Wide Web?, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 311, 320–25 (1997)
(exploring purposes served by restricting advertising to children); see also Patricia
Aufderheide, Reregulating Children’s TV, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 87, 91–92 (1989)
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of time children spend, unattended, in front of the television, coupled with
children’s inability to distinguish advertising material from program
content. 316 This argument’s companion comes in a similar form but with
different language. Because most proponents of regulation of children’s
television understand the financial nature of advertising, 317 they couple
their arguments with one that is economically persuasive. 318 This argument
attacks the basic premise of the economic model—rationality. 319 At their
developmental level children cannot be said to be rational choosers.
Targeting children with advertising campaigns therefore violates the
market protections that are said to exist with rational choosers.
Advertisers also have little incentive to target children because they lack
both purchasing power and influence over parental purchasing decisions. 320
One major concern that critics of regulating commercial speech cite is
the tendency of the government to be paternalistic in regulation. Justices
Antonin Scalia and John Paul Stevens share “aversion towards
paternalistic governmental policies that prevent men and women from

(discussing the need for effective children’s television regulation); Henry John
Uscinski, Deregulating Commercial Television: Will the Marketplace Watch Out for
Children?, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 141 (1984) (arguing that the FCC’s decision not to
specifically regulate advertising to children violates its duty to the public).
316.
See Aufderheide, supra note 315, at 92; see also Diane Aden Hayes, The
Children’s Hour Revisited: The Children’s Television Act of 1990, 46 FED. COMM. L.J.
293, 294 (1994) (stating that “[c]hildren’s high susceptibility to advertising and lack of
power in the marketplace have been the main justifications for regulating broadcasting
aimed at them”).
317.
See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 316, at 325 (indicating the market concerns for
broadcasters when the FCC regulates).
318.
See, e.g., Uscinski, supra note 315, at 167 (explaining that “the childaudience has limited purchasing power, [and] its influence over an advertisersupported medium is slight”).
319.
See generally Piety, supra note 11 (asserting that the extension of First
Amendment protection in the Commercial Speech Doctrine rests on the assumption of
rationality in the public). Advertising is protected because people are assumed to be
rational enough to see through “puffing.” Id. at 383. Advertising’s fallacious affronts
to reason are easily counterbalanced by people’s ability to “sort out information from
indoctrination.” Id. The author asserts that the Supreme Court’s stance in this regard
is denial and wishful thinking. Id. Piety further draws parallels between advertising
and the psychology of addiction. Id. at 422–37. She states, “[b]oth appear to be
characterized by denial, escapism, narcissism, isolation, insatiability, impatience, and
diminished sensitivity.” Id. at 381.
320.
See Uscinski, supra note 315, at 163–70 (exploring the perils that
accompany attaching a marketplace model to children).
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hearing facts that might not be good for them.” 321 Justice Thomas sees
regulation of advertising on the basis of the product’s potential harm as a
limitation of the right of free speech. 322 In other words, many opponents
view the regulation of advertising to children as a form of undesirable
paternalism. That is, the role of protecting and rearing children should be
left to parents. This argument is essentially a policy proposal advocating
parental intervention and oversight as a solution the problems associated
with advertising to children. 323 This family-oriented solution, as opposed to
a paternalistic, government-based remedy, has long been a part of
American rhetoric. 324 However, as Justice Scalia noted in 44 Liquormart,
“it would also be paternalism for us to prevent the people of the States
from enacting laws that we consider paternalistic, unless we have good
reason to believe that the Constitution itself forbids them.” 325
The argument against regulating advertising to children, however,
seems weak because there are many instances within the law in which
children are afforded special, often paternalistic protection. For example,
the attractive nuisance doctrine in tort law protects children from hazards
on land despite their status as trespassers by giving owners a financial
incentive to childproof their property. 326 Children are not allowed to sign
contracts for the same reason that we do not want marketers influencing
children—the bargain is skewed heavily in favor of the powerful agent. 327

321.
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
322.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that when the state seeks to silence one advertiser of a harmful
product or idea, the state may draw parallels to many other harmful products or ideas;
however, “all are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment”).
323.
See Dennis Crouch, The Social Welfare of Advertising to Children, 9 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 179, 196 (2002) (questioning, however, whether an intrafamily solution would solve the entire problem).
324.
See, e.g., MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS AND FATHERS:
GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 57 (1996) (examining
the role of family, community, and gender in the development of America’s political
and social structures).
325.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517.
326.
See Henry v. Robert Kettell Constr. Corp., 194 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ill. App.
1963).
327.
See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 212 (explaining that the enforcement of a
contract with a child can be limited due to a child’s lack of capacity). That is, a lack of
capacity “exists when a party is not competent to understand the nature and
consequences of his acts . . . . [H]e cannot make adequate judgments concerning his
utility . . . .” Id. If contract law acknowledges that children cannot make adequate

Browne 7.0

2009]

12/10/2009 3:11 PM

Advertising to Children

121

Furthermore, governments place age restrictions on the purchasing of
alcohol, cigarettes, and pornography. The very nature of what it means to
be a child is to announce that one needs assistance—one needs a “parent.”
To raise a child it takes a family, teachers, business people, community
leaders, and lawmakers—those who protect our health and safety—in
essence, it takes a village to raise a child. 328 Rather than requiring parents
to regulate potentially harmful situations, the government would be taking
on a more guiding role in the protection of children. 329
Furthermore, opponents argue that the FCC deemed the funding
from advertisements necessary to continue children’s education
programming. 330 However, what opponents of such regulation fail to
consider is that other countries have full bans on advertising, and those
countries still provide funding for an adequate amount of television
programing aimed at children. 331 A fundamental problem with achieving
further regulation, especially regarding unhealthy foods, is that legislators
tend to be on the side of big business and the food industry, making it
difficult for interest groups to influence Congress. 332
VIII. CONCLUSION
Regulations directed at advertising to children often strike a delicate
balance with First Amendment rights. However, given the evidence that
judgments, should not advertising law acknowledge a minor’s lack of capacity in an
effort to help protect children from marketers?
328.
See First Lady Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the Democratic National
Convention (Aug. 27, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITIC
S/1996/news/9608/27/hillary.speech/hillary.shtml); see generally NANCY FOLBRE, WHO
PAYS FOR THE KIDS?: GENDER AND THE STRUCTURE OF CONSTRAINT 1, 248–62(1994).
329.
See J. Morgan, Religious Upbringing, Religious Diversity, and the Child’s
Right to an Open Future, 24 STUD. IN PHIL. AND EDUC. 367, 370 (2005) (“If we
influence a child such that the adult she becomes is incapable of considering important
choices concerning her own life, then we have effectively diminished her opportunity
for self-fulfillment”). Morgan suggests that children are particularly vulnerable in that
they are subject to adult influences, and need to be directed in ways that do not limit
the formation of their character and identity. Id.
330.
Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, § 101, 104 Stat.
996, 996 (1990).
331.
KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 12, at 23.
332.
See David Kiley, A Food Fight Over Obesity in Kids, BUS. WK. ONLINE,
Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2004/nf20040930_011
0_db035.htm (noting the influence that food companies have on legislative action and
revealing that food companies have even influenced the USDA in matters concerning
the Food Guide Pyramid).
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advertising to children takes advantage of the naiveté of children, enforces
negative stereotypes, and promulgates serious health risks and obesity, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the benefits of regulating advertising
outweigh the costs.
Because the FTC is reluctant to regulate for the protection of children
due to its past failure, other government entities such as the FCC and
Congress should have a greater role in regulating advertising to children.
The history of commercial speech through case law, although at times
contradictory, substantiates further protection of children. The Supreme
Court has declared that the government has a substantial interest in
protecting children through broadcast regulation, and applying the fourpart test of Central Hudson to a hypothetical advertising ban provides
positive results. The dangers wrought by advertising to children are
palpable, and without further government regulation, future generations of
children in the United States will face a life of manipulation, ill-informed
consumerism, and poor health.
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